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Non-technical summary 
 
In this paper, we analyze if the integration of the European mutual funds industry has brought 
advantages to private and institutional investors. Moreover, we examine the possible 
determinants of fund fees as well as the effects of domiciliation decisions of fund companies. 
Investors worldwide invest in more than 65,000 different investment funds, since these are 
perceived to be liquid and diversified assets with lower cost than direct investments. The fees 
investors are generally charged include fees for the fund’s set-up, portfolio management, 
custody of the shares, marketing and sales etc. In theory, higher fees result in a lower 
investment performance. Yet it has been shown that there exists no correlation between higher 
fund fees and good fund performance. For the fund company, however, higher fees translate 
directly into higher profits, i.e. there is a conflict of interest between the market participants. 
As a result of legal and regulatory harmonization in the European financial industry, 
competition between fund companies has risen greatly over the past few years. In order to 
benefit from economies of scale, fund companies have concentrated their activities in a single 
location. This has also led to increased competition between countries seeking to attract these 
financial institutions. In this respect, Luxembourg and Ireland play a particular global role as 
specialized financial centers. However, the question arises whether investors really benefit 
from this market concentration beyond the greater number of investment opportunities.  
The results show that the fees charged by funds differ significantly across countries and 
across fund types. It is also shown that funds domiciled in Luxembourg have considerably 
lower cross-border distribution costs. This advantage is, however, countered by several 
drawbacks. Generally, funds complying with UCITS policy are most expensive for investors. 
Furthermore, fees rise with an increase in the number of countries in which the fund is 
distributed, as additional distribution partners and permits are required. The results do not 
clearly show that investors pay lower fees for funds from Luxembourg or Ireland than for 
funds of other countries. All in all, it is shown that the market integration of the European 
fund industry has reduced costs significantly, due mainly to the concentration of specialists in 
clusters and economies of scale, leading to greater welfare. The implementation of the UCITS 
IV Directive has increased the need for a more thorough examination of the supply side of the 
fund industry. 
  
 Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
Diese Arbeit geht der Frage nach, ob die europäische Finanzmarktintegration im Bereich der 
Fondsindustrie zu Vorteilen für Privatanleger und institutionelle Investoren geführt hat. Dabei 
werden mögliche Determinanten der Fondsgebühren und die Auswirkungen der 
Domizilierungsentscheidung der Fondsgesellschaft untersucht. Investoren investieren 
weltweit in mehr als 65.000 verschiedene Investmentfonds, um so, im Vergleich zu 
Direktinvestments, in liquide und diversifizierte Anlagen zu relativ geringen Kosten 
anzulegen. Investoren müssen generell eine Fondsgebühr bezahlen, die als Preis unter 
anderem für die Fondsauflage, Portfoliomanagement, Wertpapieraufbewahrung und den 
Vertrieb erhoben wird. Höhere Gebühren bedeuten für den Investor grundsätzlich eine 
geringere Investitionsrendite. Es zeigt sich zudem, dass keine Beziehung zwischen hohen 
Fondsgebühren und guter Fondsperformance besteht. Allerdings führen höhere 
Fondsgebühren gleichzeitig zu höheren Gewinnen auf Seiten der Fondsgesellschaft, so dass 
sich ein Spannungsfeld zwischen den Marktakteuren ergibt. Begünstigt durch rechtliche 
Harmonisierungen in der europäischen Finanzindustrie hat sich der Wettbewerb zwischen den 
Fondsgesellschaften in den letzten Jahren weiter erhöht. Um von Skaleneffekten zu 
profitieren, konzentrieren Fondsgesellschaften ihre Tätigkeiten an einzelnen Standorten, was 
auch zu einem erhöhten Wettbewerb zwischen Ländern um die höchste Standortattraktivität 
führt. Luxemburg und Irland spielen als spezialisierte Finanzzentren global eine besondere 
Rolle. Jedoch stellt sich die Frage, inwieweit Investoren von dieser Marktkonzentration 
profitieren, außer dass sich die Anzahl ihrer Anlagemöglichkeiten erhöht?  
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass erhebliche Unterschiede in der Höhe der Fondsgebühren 
zwischen Ländern und Fondstypen bestehen. Ebenso zeigt sich, dass deutlich geringere 
Kosten für den grenzüberschreitenden Vertrieb der in Luxemburg ansässigen Fonds anfallen. 
Diesen Vorteilen stehen aber ebenso Nachteile gegenüber. Fonds die die OGAW-Richtlinie 
erfüllen, sind für den Investor grundsätzlich teurer. Zusätzlich erhöht sich die Fondsgebühr 
mit der Anzahl an bestehenden Vertriebsländern, da zusätzliche Vertriebspartner und 
Genehmigungen benötigt werden. Die Resultate zeigen aber nicht wirklich, dass Investoren 
niedrigere Gebühren für Fonds aus Luxemburg und Irland im Vergleich zu Fonds aus den 
anderen Ländern zahlen müssen. Insgesamt wird aber festgestellt, dass die Marktintegration 
in der europäischen Fondsindustrie signifikante Kostensenkungen durch die Konzentration 
von Spezialisten im Cluster und Skaleneffekte bewirkt und somit zu Wohlfahrts-
verbesserungen führt. Die Umsetzung der aktuellen OGAW IV-Richtlinie in der EU verstärkt 
die Notwendigkeit, die Angebotsseite der Fondsbranche genauer zu untersuchen. 
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Abstract 
In this paper, we analyze whether the domiciliation decision of mutual funds has an 
impact on fund fees. To explain the fee price-setting of mutual funds, we consider 
characteristics specific to funds, fund companies, and countries. We find that fees vary 
considerably across fund types and countries. Positive impacts of financial market integration 
can be confirmed, though funds set up under the UCITS directive are more expensive. If 
funds are sold in multiple countries it drives up fees; however, these higher costs for the 
investor are outweighed by economies of scale that can be generated if the domiciliation is in 
a specialized financial center, such as Luxembourg. Larger funds and funds that are set up by 
specialized or larger fund companies have significantly lower fees. 
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1.  Introduction 
In late 2006, shortly before the financial crisis, more than 65,000 different mutual funds were 
sold around the globe with the aim of offering investors more liquid and diversified 
investments at relatively low costs in comparison to direct investments in individual assets. 
For investors, fund fees comprise the price for management, set-up, custodian, distribution 
and other services related to these funds. On the one hand, it can be argued that higher fees 
adversely affect investment performance. However, several studies give evidence that the 
variation in fund performance is not explained by fees; high-cost funds may underperform 
low-cost funds (Malkiel, 1995; Gruber, 1996; Carhart, 1997; Otten and Bams, 2002 and 
2011), but this can rather be explained by fund managers characteristics with superior asset-
picking and fund management skills (e.g. Chevalier and Ellison, 1999 or Cohen, 2008). On 
the other hand, higher fees can increase the profitability of the issuing fund company. 
However, fund companies risk losing market share when they charge higher fees than their 
competitors (Khorana and Servaes, 2007). Funds face competition in both national and 
supranational markets. In national markets, funds are sold only to investors in the country in 
which the fund is domiciled. By contrast, supranational funds are sold across borders. The 
cross-border distribution of funds has increased worldwide over the past decades owing to a 
reduction of barriers to the cross-border sale of funds. This has intensified competition among 
fund companies and has provided incentives to relocate their activities and to domicile their 
funds in countries which offer the most favorable regulatory environment. This, in turn, has 
led to greater competition among countries seeking to attract fund companies. 
In the EU, competition among countries for the best regulatory framework is intensified 
by the directive on Undertakings for Collective Investments in Transferable Securities 
(UCITS), which has created a standardized pan-European market through the introduction of 
a “product passport” for mutual funds. This passport allows any fund registered in one EU 
country to be sold in any other EU country without further lengthy authorization proceedings. 
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This standardization also applies to fund companies from outside the EU searching for the one 
domicile in Europe from which to offer funds to the entire continent. EFAMA (2010) reports 
that the majority of funds domiciled in the EU are in compliance with UCITS, accounting for 
79 percent of the value and 72 percent of the number of all EU funds in 2006. Owing to a 
favorable regulatory environment and tax system, Luxembourg and Ireland have particularly 
benefited from the introduction of the UCITS directive and have evolved into financial 
centers used by fund companies to distribute their funds around the globe. The concentration 
of funds domiciled in financial centers is further reinforced by cluster effects from 
agglomeration and economies of scale. Economic theory predicts that these cluster effects 
should lead to lower prices, better product quality, more rapid technological improvements 
and, thus, greater consumer welfare. 
Our results show that the introduction of the UCITS directive has created a European 
market for mutual funds by facilitating the cross-border distribution of funds. However, 
owing to greater administrative requirements, UCITS funds are more costly to set up than 
non-UCITS funds. Furthermore, funds sold in many countries are often more expensive than 
funds sold in a smaller number of countries. These disadvantages may be outweighed by the 
significant economies of scale that can be generated if the domiciliation of funds is 
centralized in financial centers. Moreover, financial integration creates economic benefits by 
encouraging the concentration of fund specialists in such clusters. These benefits are reflected 
by significantly lower costs for the cross-border distribution of Luxembourg-based funds 
compared to funds domiciled in other countries. Our results are based on a dataset on mutual 
fund fees charged by more than 12,000 mutual funds around the world between 1997 and 
2006, covering 80 and 75 percent, respectively, of total global fund starts based on fund size 
and the total number of funds launched. 
Our paper complements the literature on mutual fund fees in several aspects. Some 
studies suggest that economies of scale and scope exist for larger fund companies, which may 
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be reflected in lower fund fees or enhanced net performance. These studies mainly analyze 
US equity and fixed income funds (e.g. Collins and Mack, 1997; Latzko, 1999; Ang and Lin, 
2001 and Chen et al., 2004). Elton et al. (2003) show that performance-based fees increase 
market demand, while Barber et al. (2005) and Wilcox (2003) find that investors are more 
reluctant to accept non-recurring fees, such as front-loads, than recurring expenses.2 Ruenzi 
(2006) examines the fee structures for different fund classes of one fund. He finds that front 
loads alone do not lead to a separation of investors, but that a combination of recurring and 
non-recurring fees usually lead to the best outcome for investors. More recently, Gil-Bazo and 
Ruiz-Verdu (2009) show that funds with inferior before-fee performance levy higher fees. 
The authors seize on the findings of Christoffersen and Musto (2002) and explain the relation 
between fees and performance as the result of different strategic fee-settings by the fund 
company in the presence of investors with different degrees of sensitivity to fund 
performance. 
The study most closely related to our paper is Khorana et al. (2009). They focus on the 
determinants of mutual fund fees and show that there is substantial variation in fees 
worldwide. Fees vary by investment objective and fund type. In addition, they find that larger 
funds and larger fund companies charge lower fees, while funds distributed in a greater 
number of countries charge higher fees, as do funds domiciled in so-called “offshore 
locations” such as Ireland and Luxembourg.3 This is consistent with our dataset which shows 
                                                 
2 In earlier papers, Chordia (1996) and Nanda et al. (2000) analyze the optimal price setting of funds. Chordia 
(1996) assumes that the fund market is a monopoly in order to analyze the price setting behavior of fund 
companies offering two different funds, while Nanda et al. (2000) presume that fees are determined 
endogenously in a competitive fund market. 
3 Khorana et al. (2005) and, in a similar approach, Fernando et al. (2003) with a focus on mutual fund industry 
growth, investigate why in some countries funds have been widely adopted in investors’ portfolios and less so in 
others. Hence, their analyses focus especially on demand-side factors. Khorana et al. (2005) find that the demand 
for mutual funds is higher in countries with stricter rules, laws, and regulations, specifically where mutual fund 
investors’ rights are better protected. The fund industry is also found to be larger in countries with a wealthier 
and more educated population and with an older fund industry. Fernando et al. (2003) find that better developed 
market-based financial systems, as well as higher market returns, liquidity and lower volatility have a positive 
influence on market growth. In high-income countries, openness to trade and a higher share of high-tech exports 
is conducive, while in middle-income countries per capita income and strong banking systems contribute to 
market growth. Furthermore, the legal origin is important (equity funds are more advanced in common law 
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that funds domiciled in Luxembourg are significantly more expensive than funds domiciled in 
other countries despite the benefits often attributed to financial clusters: agglomeration 
effects, backward and forward linkages in the value-added chain, and increasing economies of 
scale (Krugman, 1991 and Venables, 1996). In the fund industry, for example, having many 
fund administration specialists may lead to lower costs for all firms in the cluster, since they 
can share common services and knowledge or hire specialists without having to pay 
relocation costs.  
This may be important for fund companies, as indicated by a recent survey by Lang 
(2012) among executives of predominantly German fund companies. The survey suggests that 
the decision on where to domicile a fund is not primarily driven by cost factors such as 
registration charges, fund company tax burden and labor costs, but rather by the quality of the 
workforce and the approval process which may allow firms to set up more innovative and 
complex funds in a shorter period of time than in other countries. Thus traditional cost factors 
do not seem to be the primary reason to domicile a fund in financial centers. This may explain 
why funds from Luxembourg continue to charge higher fees than funds from other countries. 
Higher fees in financial centers may also be due to path dependence and lock-in effects 
(Krugman, 1991; Martin and Sunley, 2006; Sydow et al., 2009).4 For the mutual fund 
industry, this may imply that funds are domiciled in Luxembourg because the structures 
necessary to set up such funds already exist in this country and not because of a favorable 
environment for the mutual fund industry. Hence, higher fees may also be the result of 
inefficient existing market structures. Another reason for the high level of fees may be that 
funds from Luxembourg are often designed for sale in other countries. The rising number of 
distributors in different countries may increase costs for the fund company, as more 
negotiations are required on sales conditions and margins for the involved parties. 
                                                                                                                                                        
countries and fixed income funds are more advanced in civil law systems) and restrictions on competing 
products enhance market development. 
4 Porteous (1999) applies the concept of historical path dependence to financial centers, which may leads to a 
lock-in-effect. 
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Furthermore, registering funds in several markets significantly raises costs, which may 
outweigh the potential benefits arising from agglomeration effects and scale economies. If 
supranational funds from Luxembourg comply with the UCITS Directive and avoid the cross-
border distribution costs of registering in multiple markets, the added administrative burdens 
may increase the overall costs of UCITS funds compared to non-UCITS funds. 
Our results indicate that the distribution of funds across borders indeed significantly 
increases fees. Our estimates suggest that selling a fund in seven countries instead of only one 
country increases the total expense ratio by almost 30 basis points. Complying with the 
UCITS directive raises mutual fund fees by an additional seven basis points. However, we 
also find that distributing funds from Luxembourg abroad is significantly less costly than 
from other countries in our sample. To illustrate, our results suggest that a fund domiciled in 
Luxembourg and sold in seven countries has a total expense ratio which is 24 basis points 
lower than that of a fund domiciled in another country and sold in the same number of 
countries. This indicates that Luxembourg offers significant cost advantages in the cross-
border distribution of funds. 
Our results further show that the size of the fund and the size of the originating mutual 
fund company affect mutual fund fees by reducing administration and management costs 
through economies of scale. These cost benefits are passed through to investors. More 
specialized fund companies charge lower fees, indicating efficiency gains from experience 
effects and specialist knowledge. Furthermore, fund companies charge higher fees if they are 
domiciled in countries that legally require an independent custodian. The time necessary to 
start a mutual fund and to fulfill all regulatory requirements matters as well. However, in 
contrast to the intuition that a longer start-up period increases fees, we find the opposite. 
Funds issued with shorter start-up time may have competitive advantages relative to funds 
that have longer start-up times. This may be particularly relevant for funds investing in asset 
classes that are subject to current market trends, such as gold or other commodities, and may 
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give fund companies greater scope to raise fees due to less cost-sensitive investors, such as 
those seeking for huge returns. This may also explain why funds in Luxembourg continue to 
charge higher fees than funds domiciled in most other countries despite the favorable 
regulatory environment and scale economies that can be generated by domiciling funds in 
financial centers.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the data and 
provides extensive descriptive statistics on possible determinants of mutual fund fees, while 
the econometric model and our results are compiled in Section 3. In Section 4, we check 
whether our results are driven by the choice of the sample and test whether Luxembourg and 
Ireland have competitive advantages in distributing mutual funds abroad. Section 5 
summarizes our findings. 
 
2.  Data and Mutual Fund Fees 
2.1. Dataset 
The sample is based on data on mutual funds (open-end pooled investment vehicles that 
invest in transferable securities and are traded at the fund’s net asset value) that were set up 
around the world between 1997 and 2006. A relatively new sample period is needed to 
account for the market integrating effects resulting from the recent facilitation of cross-border 
sales and domiciliation in different jurisdictions. The domicile is the country in which a fund 
is legally registered. The year 2006 was chosen as a cut-off point to prevent distortions caused 
by the financial crisis. Our sample covers 80 percent of the total mutual fund starts based on 
fund size and 75 percent based on the number of funds started. The information on mutual 
fund starts comes from Morningstar Direct.5 We use the inception date in Morningstar for 
                                                 
5 Furthermore, we focus on worldwide cross-border transactions. For this reason, we cannot use the US 
survivorship free database CRSP. Morningstar Direct attempts to distinguish between all investments and only 
surviving investments but understates the reality of closed funds. The CRSP database lists every single share 
class of a fund as an individual entry. Our sample is not free of survivorship bias. If the disappeared group of 
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matching, i.e. the date on which the fund began operating. Any fund not characterized as the 
oldest share class is excluded to account for errors caused by duplicity of observations in our 
data.6 Furthermore, we drop all observations for which we do not have information on fees 
and fund size.  
Table 1 indicates that annual mutual fund starts increased between 1997 and 2006. 
Fernando et al. (2003) and Heinemann (2002) relate the growth of mutual funds during the 
1990s to the globalization of financial markets, a strong performance of equity and bond 
markets, an increased demand for mutual funds by an aging population in high- and middle 
income countries, as well as to the search for safe, liquid but high-return investments. The rise 
in the number of mutual fund funds starts was interrupted by the stock market crash in 2002 
and 2003, which led to a significant reduction of mutual fund starts which is reflected by our 
sample. 
[insert Table 1 about here] 
 
The distribution of funds broken down by fund type is shown in Table 2. Our sample 
includes allocation (2,138), alternative (1,575), equity (5,497), fixed income (1,960) and 
money market funds (565).7 Allocation funds mix equity, bonds, and cash, while alternative 
funds invest in currencies, derivatives as well as commodities and may employ shorting as a 
strategy. In contrast to allocation and alternative funds with possible specific derivative 
structures, equity and fixed income funds more easily qualify for a UCITS passport. This is 
reflected in Table 2, which shows that more than 50 percent of equity and fixed income funds 
in our sample are UCITS funds. In Luxembourg and Ireland, even 90 percent of all funds are 
compliant with the UCITS directive.  
                                                                                                                                                        
closed funds did not depend on observable characteristics of the funds, we would not have a bias, but studies 
show e.g. closed funds to be smaller than surviving funds (Carhart, 1997; Zhao, 2005). 
6 Sometimes, the same fund is recognized twice or more times in the Morningstar database, for example, emitted 
in different currencies. Given that the content of these funds is the same with different share classes, additional 
observations for one domiciliation could bias our results and will be omitted. Similarly, Morningstar often 
publishes the same fund assets for different share classes. 
7 Municipal fixed income funds are excluded as they are mostly driven by US tax reasons. 
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[insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Table 3 provides an overview of the geographical distribution of mutual funds and their 
origins. The total sample comprises 11,735 mutual funds from 22 countries. The countries in 
which most funds are domiciled are Luxembourg (2,934) and the United States (1,984). We 
distinguish between funds domiciled by fund companies with a foreign parent company and 
funds started by a domestic fund company. In Luxembourg, funds domiciled by foreign fund 
companies are much more important than in all other countries. Both countries combined 
account for more than two thirds of all funds started by foreign fund companies worldwide.  
  
[insert Table 3 about here] 
 
These fund companies primarily use Luxembourg and Ireland as hubs to distribute their 
funds abroad, as indicated in Table 4. Funds from Luxembourg are, on average, distributed in 
almost 12 countries, while funds domiciled in Ireland are, on average, sold in almost 9 
countries. Although these funds are also registered for sale in Luxembourg and Ireland, they 
are mainly sold abroad. In contrast, in most other countries in our sample mutual funds are 
mainly sold in a single market - the country in which they are domiciled - and not set up for 
cross-border distribution. 
[insert Table 4 about here] 
 
The large number of foreign fund companies and the large number of countries in which 
funds are sold reflect Luxembourg and Ireland’s role as financial centers for the mutual fund 
industry. Both countries have developed into financial centers owing to the fast 
implementation of the UCITS directive and the creation of a favorable environment for the 
European mutual fund industry. In 1988, Luxembourg became the first EU Member State to 
transpose the directive concerning UCITS into national law. The legal and regulatory 
environment thus created a competitive edge for Luxembourg as a first mover over rival 
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financial centers. Ireland was popular for low corporate tax rates and other incentives for 
companies to set up operations in Dublin’s International Financial Services Centre established 
in 1987. The Irish mutual fund industry evolved in 1989, when the UCITS directive was 
implemented in Ireland, providing a competitive advantage for mutual funds set up in Ireland 
owing to a combination of low tax rates for fund companies and easy access to the EU market 
via the product passport. In the following years, Ireland enacted several legal changes 
ensuring full availability of fund products managed by international fund companies. This 
regulatory flexibility combined with the enactment of a tax exemption for Irish domiciled 
funds in 2000 and the sales permission of the funds to domestic investors has resulted in an 
enormous growth of the mutual fund industry in Ireland. Both locations are not just used for 
sales in the EU, they have established themselves as locations to domicile mutual funds to be 
sold worldwide. 
 
2.2 Fragmentation of Mutual Fund Fees 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the determinants of mutual fund fees. In general, fees can 
be divided into performance-based fees and non-performance-based fees. Performance-based 
fees are charged when performance exceeds certain pre-specified benchmarks. Since they 
play a minor role in the global mutual fund industry, except in the segment of hedge funds, 
and are not related to domiciliation costs, we concentrate on non-performance-based fees.8 
The latter can further be categorized into non-recurring fees that are charged once and those 
that are charged frequently. Fees charged once can be front loads, redemption fees, or 
conditioned redemption fees. In most cases, funds charge a combination of one-off and 
                                                 
8 Performance-based fees are not common in the US because mutual fund fees have had to be symmetric since 
1970 (Khorana and Servaes, 2008). Elton et al. (2003) study performance-based fees in the US and find that in 
1999 only 1.7 percent of all funds charged incentive fees, but these funds control 10.5 percent of all fund assets. 
On average these funds do not earn any performance-based fees, because they do not outperform their 
benchmarks. Sigurdsson (2007) finds that in Europe especially equity funds with a share in assets of 12 percent 
have incentive elements. 
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recurring fees.9 It cannot be determined exactly how much the investor is charged through 
non-recurring price elements, because most of the distribution channels usually give investors 
various discounts. Therefore, the actual fees paid may differ from the fees published because 
of the bargaining power of institutional investors. The published non-recurring fees in our 
dataset are thus the maximum rates and may be negotiated to lower levels.10 Front loads are 
usually levied for distribution. Hence, they are income for the distributor rather than for the 
fund company. The discounts increased between 1997 and 2006, resulting in larger 
differences for old funds. The difference between the posted and paid fee also varies between 
countries. Fees are maintained over time once they are established. Fund companies cannot 
select the countries and apply different non-recurring fees in the main share class. Including 
front and end load fees would have a distorting effect as frequent transactions, i.e. buying and 
selling funds are not representative. The typical buy-and-hold investor tends to invest based 
on long-term considerations. For this reason, we concentrate on recurring fees. 
We follow the literature (e.g. Khorana et al., 2009 and Bergstresser et al., 2009) and use 
the following two measures of recurring mutual fund fees: (1) total expense ratio (TER) and 
(2) management fee (MGFEE). Data on mutual fund fees comes from Morningstar Direct, 
which gathers the data from the funds’ annual reports. Management fees are the annual 
revenues of the investment management. They are used to pay investment advisers for 
supervising and rebalancing a fund’s portfolio as well as for managing its operations.11 The 
total expense ratio includes not only management fees, but all annual expenses levied by a 
                                                 
9 The share of the recurring part in the total revenues of a US or European mutual fund company has been 
increasing for years (Ruenzi, 2006). This result may stem from the large increase in fund volume and the fact 
that the number of no-load funds has increased over the past years. Barber et al. (2005) show that investors treat 
different types of fees differently and pay more attention to fees that are more apparent, such as front-loads, and 
not the annual expenses.  
10 To index these one-time costs Khorana et al. (2009) assume an investor’s average holding period of five years 
and split the front and back-end loads. 
11 Portfolio managers in the fund management are located independently from legal domiciliation and frequently 
work in teams. According to the findings of Bär et al. (2011), fund companies prefer a portfolio management in a 
team of managers when funds are on average larger and specialized knowledge is essential and therefor cite 
balanced funds as an example. In some cases, fund companies employ another company, called the sub-advisor, 
to handle the fund's day-to-day management, e.g. due to specific industry knowledge. In these instances, the 
portfolio manager is generally located in the same place as the fund's sub-advisor. 
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fund on its investors, covering distribution, administration, custodian, transfer agent, 
accounting, audit, legal and others. It, hence, is a much broader definition of mutual fund fees 
than management fees.12 In addition, we extend the two measures by a compound ratio 
calculating the difference between the total expense ratio and management fee as a proxy for 
(3) administrative fees (ADFEE). Administrative fees should better reflect domiciliation 
costs, because the fund management is usually located in a country other than the fund 
domicile. ADFEE should measure costs unrelated to the fund management such as fees for 
the custodian, transfer agent, accounting, audit, legal companies and for own administrative 
functions of a fund company.13 
Table 5 provides an overview of the fees of these three measures of recurring fees by 
country of domiciliation. We compare the asset-weighted and unweighted average levels of 
fees for all funds as well as for allocation, alternative, equity, fixed income and money market 
funds. We feel that asset-weighted fees are a better representation of the fees paid by the 
consumer. Mutual fund fees vary considerably from country to country. For example, on an 
asset-weighted basis, mean total expense ratios range from 0.59 in Switzerland to 1.92 in 
Finland. Funds from Luxembourg have a mean expense ratio of 1.45 (weighted by fund size). 
This does not place it among the most affordable funds despite the cluster effects attributed to 
financial clusters. Irish funds, in contrast, have a much lower mean expense ratio of 1.05 
(weighted by fund size). Similar results are obtained for management and administrative fees. 
Although this perspective neglects the influence of other important variables, such as fund 
                                                 
12 Morningstar publishes several expense ratios with different levels of coverage. We use the audited trailing 
perspective of the annual report net expense ratio, which is the “percentage of fund assets used to pay for 
operating expenses and management fees, including 12b-1 fees, administrative fees, and all other asset-based 
costs incurred by the fund. Fund expenses are reflected in the fund's NAV. According to the analyses of Khorana 
et al. (2009), it typically includes “the following types of fees: accounting, administrator, advisor, auditor, board 
of directors, custodial, distribution (12b-1), legal, organizational, professional, registration, shareholder 
reporting, sub-advisor, and transfer agency.” It does not reflect the fund’s brokerage costs. Sales charges are also 
not included in the expense ratio, because “the charge may vary depending on the amount invested and the fund 
chosen”, ICI (2010: 190-191). 
13 However, since published management fees usually differ in terms of the services included, ADFEE may also 
include costs unrelated to the set-up and running of funds. Despite these limitations we think that the addition of 
ADFEE gives us a more representative picture of the fee structure as it serves as a proxy for the local differences 
in efficiency rather than salary levels. 
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type and the number of countries in which a fund is sold, it is striking that Luxembourg 
continues to charge higher fees than most other countries despite the cost advantages that may 
arise from industry size advantages and cluster effects, which are usually attributed to 
financial centers. 
[insert Table 5 about here] 
 
2.3 Determinants of Mutual Fund Fees 
In the following, we present descriptive statistics of mutual fund fees in order to identify 
potential determinants that may explain why fees differ across countries. An important 
determinant of mutual fund fees is the fund type, since factors such as different creative 
leeway in the regulation of the fund and the fund company or different authorization 
proceedings for underlying assets and the use of hedging instruments with derivatives should 
be more relevant for some fund types than for others. This is reflected in Table 6, which 
shows that equity14 and allocation funds are, on average, the most expensive, while money 
market and fixed income funds are the cheapest, owing to lower transaction and management 
costs. Furthermore, competition from banks and insurance companies is greater for the latter 
two types of funds, because deposit products are a direct competitor to fixed income and 
money market funds.15 This should reduce the scope of fund companies to raise fees on 
money market and fixed income funds.  
[insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Another important determinant of mutual fund fees may be the number of countries in 
which a mutual fund is sold. Since mutual fund companies have to incur registration costs for 
each country in which the fund is sold, fees should rise as the number of countries in which a 
                                                 
14 Cooper et al. (2011) analyze dispersion in mutual fund fees and find evidence of systematic differences in 
prices across US equity funds.  
15 The variation in management fees is rarely a result of the ratio of the non-recurring to the recurring part of the 
total fees (e.g. Spanish funds have traditionally been sold without a load fee, a fact that explains some of the 
highest management fees in Europe). 
13 
 
fund is sold increases. This is reflected in Table 7, which shows a positive relationship 
between mutual fund fees and the number of countries in which a fund is sold. To illustrate, 
selling a fund in over seven countries should raise the asset-weighted total expense ratio, on 
average, by almost 60 basis points compared to a fund which is sold in only one country. This 
may explain why funds domiciled in Luxemburg report higher fees than funds domiciled in 
other European countries, although the UCITS regulation should lead to similar fees across 
the EU (European Commission, 2009).  
[insert Table 7 about here]   
 
Fund size is an important determinant of mutual fund fees as well. Larger funds should 
generate economies of scale in fund management and administration, leading to lower mutual 
fund fees.16 This is illustrated in Table 8, which relates mutual fund fees to fund size. Table 8 
indicates that average mutual fund fees decrease as the size of the fund increases. For 
example, a fund that belongs to the first quartile based on fund size has an average total 
expense ratio of 1.57 weighted by assets. In contrast, a fund in the fourth quartile has a 
significantly lower average total expense ratio of 1.02. The negative relationship is also 
observable for management and administrative fees, although fees tend to increase at lower 
fund sizes, before they start to decrease. This may indicate that fund companies have to incur 
fixed overhead costs for fund management and administration in the first stage, before 
economies of scale lead to lower average costs. To control for the non-linear relationship 
between fund size and fees, we later include a squared term in the regression analysis. In 
addition, we test whether economies of scale also derive from a greater size of the mutual 
fund company.  
[insert Table 8 about here]   
 
                                                 
16 Earlier studies indicate economies of scale in the mutual fund industry for the US (Baumol et al., 1980 and 
France (Dermine and Röller, 1992). 
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3. Econometric Model 
Since the determinants of mutual fund fees are correlated, we estimate the following 
regression model to isolate the effect of several fund-, company- and country-specific 
variables on mutual fund fees: 
 
ijct 1 2 3 4i ijct ijct ct ijctFee FUNDTYPE X Z Y            
 
where Fee is either the total expense ratio, management fee or administrative fee of 
fund i that was set up by fund company j in country c and year t. FUNDTYPE refers to a set 
of dummy variables for different fund types. We distinguish between allocation, fixed 
income, money market and alternative funds. Equity funds are the benchmark. In addition, we 
include a dummy variable for institutional (INSTITUTIONAL) and guarantee funds 
(GUARANTEE).  
X  is a matrix of fund-specific, Z a matrix of company-specific variables and Y a matrix 
of country controls. The fund-specific variables used are the size of the fund (FUNDSIZE), 
fund age (FUNDAGE) and the number of countries in which a fund is sold (SALE). Firm-
specific controls are size (FIRMSIZE), age of the fund company (FIRMAGE) and the degree 
of product specialization (SPECIAL). In addition, we test whether foreign fund companies 
have competitive disadvantages relative to domestic fund companies in issuing funds 
(FOREIGN). Country variables are included in matrix Y and control for fund-specific 
regulations such as the requirement of having an independent custodian (CUSTODIAN), the 
possibility of having umbrella structures (UMBRELLA), the level of taxation of the fund 
company (TAX) and the time necessary to start a fund (STARTUP). Furthermore, we include 
a set of variables controlling for the size of the financial sector as well as the overall level of 
regulation in the financial sector.  
For a complete list of variables included in the model see Table 9. ijct  is the error term 
and 1 2 3, , ,     and 4  are coefficient vectors. To account for the role of Luxembourg and 
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Ireland as financial centers, we include dummies for Luxembourg (LU) and Ireland (IE). To 
remove outliers, we use Cook’s (1977) distance criterion. Moreover, since mutual fund fees 
may not be independent within firms, we use robust standard errors clustered at the level of 
the fund company.17 
[insert Table 9 about here] 
 
The potential determinants of mutual fund fees are based on Khorana et al. (2005, 
2009). In addition, we use evidence of Lang (2012), who provides background information on 
the fund company decision process to choose the most favorable domicile in Europe. Based 
on a survey among executives of 47 fund companies from Europe, he examines which 
location factors are relevant to start up a UCITS fund and how European countries compete 
against each other to attract mutual fund companies. The survey results reveal that continuity 
in legal stability, the approval process and the availability and qualification of specialized 
experts in a cluster play the most important role. Cost factors such as registration charges, 
fund company tax burden and labor costs are, in contrast, generally considered to be less 
important in the domiciliation decision. According to the experts surveyed, Luxembourg is 
best in four of the five aforementioned factors, while Ireland ranks second based on three out 
of five of the most relevant location factors. This suggests that the decision to domicile a fund 
in Luxembourg and Ireland is not primarily driven by location factors usually assumed to 
reduce costs, but rather by the quality of the workforce and the approval process which may 
allow companies to set up more innovative and complex funds in a shorter period of time than 
in other countries.    
The regression analysis proceeds in steps to prevent multicollinearity among the 
explanatory variables and to test whether our results are robust to the inclusion of different 
                                                 
17 We additionally follow Khorana et al. (2009) and cluster fees at the level of fund types. The results are 
quantitatively and qualitatively the same. The results can be obtained from the authors upon request. Since we 
think that clustering standard errors at the firm level is more appropriate than at the level of fund types, we report 
the results with firm-level clustered standard errors.  
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sets of control variables. First, we include country dummies as well as a set of fund- and firm-
specific variables in the model to find out which fund and firm characteristics determine 
mutual fund fees. We call this our baseline model. Second, we include several regulatory 
variables to analyze the impact of fund-specific regulations on mutual fund fees. Third, we 
use several other country-variables to check whether the results for our fund-specific 
regulatory variables are driven by some other country characteristics. Finally, we test if our 
results are sensitive to the sample chosen and analyze whether Luxembourg and Ireland have 
comparative costs advantages in distributing mutual funds abroad compared to all other 
countries. 
 
3.1 Baseline Regression 
In the first step of the regression analysis, we include a set of fund- and firm-specific control 
variables. To control for unobserved heterogeneity across countries, the model is estimated 
with country dummy variables. Owing to the importance of Luxembourg (LU) and Ireland 
(IE) as financial centers, we report the coefficients for these dummies. The coefficients of the 
remaining country dummies are not reported for the sake of brevity. For a description of the 
variables used in the regression analysis see Table 9. The results of the baseline model are 
reported in Table 10 (Model 1). 
 
[insert Table 10 about here] 
 
The results suggest that the fund type matters for mutual fund fees. Consistent with 
Khorana et al. (2009), we find that the fees of allocation (ALLOCATION), alternative 
(ALTERNATIVE), fixed income (FIXED INCOME) and money market funds (MONEY 
MARKET) are significantly lower (at the 1-percent level) than the fees of equity funds, the 
benchmark. Institutional funds have lower fees as well, as indicated by the significant (at the 
1-percent level) and negative coefficient for INSTITUTIONAL. Institutional investors are 
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organizations pooling large sums of money and their funds may be cheaper than funds that are 
not set up for institutional investors. Because of their small investor group they do not require 
extensive marketing expenses and costs to fulfill requirements of private consumer protection. 
Furthermore, employees in the treasury units of their organizations often specify the 
investment strategy and take an active part in investment management which may further 
reduce costs. 
In contrast, guarantee funds (GUARANTEE) report significantly (at the 1-percent level) 
higher total expense ratios and management fees than funds that do not guarantee the value of 
the initial investment. This contrasts with Khorana et al. (2009). They argue that guarantee 
funds should have lower fees, since fund management is easier for guarantee funds as they 
often mimic an underlying index. Guarantee funds may, however, also have higher fees for 
the investor. First, the set of derivatives required for their strategy may increase transaction 
costs. Furthermore, derivative elements may reduce price transparency. This may increase 
mutual fund companies’ possibilities to raise fees. Second, an increasing market demand for a 
protection of the initial investment may enable management companies to charge higher fees 
for guarantee funds. This argument will also play an important role in the explanation of the 
outcome when checking for the start-up time later on. However, the increase in the total 
expense ratio seems to be entirely driven by higher management fees as we do not find  
evidence that administrative fees are significantly higher for guarantee funds. Higher 
management fees, hence, seem to be the dominant factor that makes guarantee funds more 
expensive. 
Funds that are set up under the UCITS directive are more expensive for investors as 
well, as indicated by the significant coefficient for UCITS. These results hold even though we 
control for the number of countries in which a fund is sold, which is an important determinant 
of fees, as we will show later. According to our estimates, investors have to pay, on average, a 
total-expense ratio which is 7 basis points higher for a UCITS fund than for funds that do not 
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comply with the UCITS directive. This may reflect the fact that UCITS funds are subject to 
stricter requirements which increase the costs of UCITS funds compared to non-UCITS 
funds. The registration procedure of cross-border funds is often complex and leads to 
uncertainty. UCITS funds benefit from the simplified notification process. Nevertheless, the 
requirements on which documents have to be presented still differ from country to country. 
Because of the complexity, the notification procedure has developed into a de facto 
registration procedure, which can be very time consuming and significantly increases costs 
(Lang, 2012).18 The results also suggest that UCITS funds have higher fund management 
costs, as indicated by the positive and significant (at the 1-percent level) coefficient in the 
regression for management fees. In contrast, we find evidence that fund companies offering 
UCITS funds may benefit from the cost effects of the economies of scale created by a larger 
market, as indicated by the negative and significant coefficient in the regression for 
administrative costs (ADFEE).  
Furthermore, we include a dummy variable controlling for the nationality of the fund 
(FOREIGN). FOREIGN does not identify funds sold outside of their domicile (and that are 
not offshore funds), but it identifies whether funds are set up by a foreign fund company. 
Ferreira and Ramos (2009) find that fees tend to be higher in countries where foreign mutual 
fund companies have a larger market share. FOREIGN allows us to identify whether foreign 
mutual fund companies have cost disadvantages relative to domestic fund companies in 
domiciling funds. Foreign funds may be disadvantaged by market entry costs, such as 
company’s start-up costs and specialized recruitment. Our results do not provide strong 
evidence that foreign mutual fund companies offer funds at higher costs. FOREIGN turns out 
to be insignificant. This indicates that market integration seems to work in the globalized 
mutual fund industry and that fund companies do not have cost disadvantages compared to 
                                                 
18 UCITS have also become a global brand enjoying considerable success in Asia, Latin America and the Middle 
East. The governments and the fund associations of Luxembourg and Ireland, for example, arrange international 
road shows with government officials to advertise the advantages of their country as domiciles for funds. 
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domestic companies. Furthermore, even if the first-time registration in a foreign country 
brings about disproportional set-up costs, these disadvantages may not outweigh benefits in 
the long run. 
Fund characteristics are important determinants of mutual fund fees as well. Consistent 
with Khorana et al. (2009), we find that funds that are sold in many countries are significantly 
(at the 1-percent level) more expensive than funds sold in a small number of countries 
(SALE). SALE is positive and significant for management fees as well, but positive and 
insignificant for administrative fees. The sale of funds in multiple countries drives up fees as 
funds need to obtain authorization in every country. In addition, increasing distribution 
expenses are used to finance activities such as advertising, printing of sale literature for other 
than current investors and especially for payments to broker-dealers and shareholder servicing 
agents. Selling a fund in multiple countries requires business negotiations on the sales 
conditions with a larger number of distributors from different countries. Furthermore, with a 
growing number of distributors their individual market power to minimize the margins of the 
fund company could also shrink. This effect may also translate into higher fees for investors.19 
Since funds that are sold abroad are mainly domiciled in Luxembourg and Ireland, in Section 
4 we analyze in greater detail whether these countries have comparative cost advantages in 
distributing funds across borders.  
The size of the mutual fund and the fund company is an important determinant of fund 
fees as well.20 The size of a fund is measured by the logarithm of total fund assets (FUND 
SIZE), while the size of the fund company is the logarithm of total assets under management 
                                                 
19 A comparison of the component costs of average TERs between cross-border and US funds reveals the 
importance of distribution costs for European funds. For an actively managed equity fund, for example, the 
average fractions for investment management and distribution of the total fee in 2009 were 42 percent and 37 
percent in Europe, respectively, and 51 percent and 14 percent in the US (Moisson, 2009). 
20 Khorana and Servaes (1999) find that large fund companies and companies that have more experience in 
opening funds are more likely to open new funds. 
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(FIRM SIZE).21 If economies of scale reduce costs, we would expect larger funds and funds 
that are set up by larger fund companies to have lower fees. The cumulative experience in 
larger fund companies should lead to lower costs and fees as well (see e.g. Porter, 1980). This 
is what we find. In line with Collins and Mack (1997), Latzko (1999), Ang and Lin (2001), 
Latzko (2003) and Chen et al. (2004), we find that the total expense ratio decrease with the 
size of the fund as reflected by the negative and significant (at the 1-percent level) coefficient 
for FUND SIZE. 
Larger firms also report significantly (at the 1-percent level) lower management fees as 
indicated by the negative and significant coefficient for FIRM SIZE, while there is no 
evidence that they decrease as the size of the fund increases. This is in line with the findings 
of Gao and Livingston (2008) who find that the decrease in fees for larger funds comes from 
minor expenses (e.g. custodian, printing, registration, auditing fees), not from a change in 
management fees. To control for the potential non-linearity of fund size and firm, we 
additionally include squared terms of fund size and firm size. Since they turn out to be 
insignificant and since the main results remain unchanged, we do not report the results for the 
sake of brevity. Furthermore, this result may indicate that funds keep their fee structure in 
spite of growing assets and that established funds are able to charge higher fees as they attract 
a great demand because they are seen as a more promising investment.22  
                                                 
21 The variable FIRM SIZE faces limitations by the Morningstar Database. In contrast to the Lipper database, 
which only covers Europe, Morningstar refers to each legal firm by its legal name without providing a reference 
about its relationship to other firms. For example, if firm ‘A’ has a subsidiary located in Luxembourg called ‘A 
LU’ we cannot trace its relationship back to A, especially since variations in firm names are rarely this simple 
and consistent. Consequently, the firm size tends to be smaller than the true economic size of a group. In 
addition, results may be contorted if foreign subsidiaries are consistently smaller than their counterparts at home. 
Firm size is also limited to fund assets under management and excludes any non-mutual fund assets. 
22 Latzko (2003) provides related explanations. The author utilizes a panel data set containing up to seven annual 
observations on a cross-section of 398 US equity and fixed income funds and analyzes the relationship between 
asset size and various published categories of fund expenses. Interestingly all categories indicate scale 
economies in administration, except the payments for distribution, whereby diseconomies of scale were assessed 
when assets grow. The greatest sources of economies of scale are indicated in operating activities such as 
custodian, audit and legal, shareholder report, registration fee and managers expenses, although they comprise a 
small portion of total costs. 
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The age of a fund may be a relevant determinant of mutual fund fees as well. Hence, we 
include FUND AGE. FUND AGE is the logarithm of the number of years since the 
establishment of a fund. In addition, we control for the age of the fund company (FIRM 
AGE). FIRM AGE is the logarithm of years since the first fund was set up by the fund 
company. Both variables capture potential experience effects. Older funds and firms should, 
for example, have had more time to establish well-practiced operating cycles for the 
domiciliation of funds, which should reduce fees. However, fees may increase if established 
operating cycles are outdated and lead to inefficiencies. Older firms may also face higher 
fixed costs when relocating their fund set-up division. In line with Khorana et al. (2009), our 
results support neither of these hypotheses. FUND AGE and FIRM AGE turn out to be 
insignificant.  
Fees may not only depend on the size or the age of the mutual fund company but also 
on the degree of product specialization. For this reason, we include SPECIAL.23 A priori, we 
would expect fees of more specialized fund companies to be lower, as fund specialists may 
generate efficiency gains from experience effects and specialist knowledge. Our results do not 
support this hypothesis as SPECIAL turns out to be negative, but insignificant in most 
regressions. Due to the important role of Luxembourg and Ireland for the global industry, we 
include a dummy variable for Luxembourg (LU) and Ireland (IE). In most of the models, LU 
is significant and positive, while IE turns out to be mostly significant, but negative for the 
total expense ratio and management fees. In contrast, both variables are mostly insignificant 
for administrative fees.  
                                                 
23 Assume, for example, a fund company only issues equity and money market funds. Based on the size of the 
individual funds, equity funds account for 60 and money market funds for 40 percent of the funds issued. The 
value for SPECIAL is then calculated as 60ଶ ൅	40ଶ ൌ 5,200. If the fund company had concentrated on equity 
funds only, SPECIAL would, in contrast, be 100ଶ ൌ 10,000. If it had not concentrated on any type fund and 
issued the same proportion of every fund type, SPECIAL would be 20ଶ ൅ 20ଶ ൅ 20ଶ ൅ 20ଶ ൅ 20ଶ ൌ 2,000. 
SPECIAL, hence, ranges between 2,000 and 10,000 with higher values indicating a greater degree of product 
specialization. 
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There are several possible explanations for our findings. In the past, both countries had 
tax and regulatory advantages over other EU nations, which helped to attract many fund 
companies. However, the advantages of this regulatory arbitrage have reduced over time. In 
particular, the common European framework of UCITS has achieved harmonization across all 
countries. In view of the functioning processes and the current available unique infrastructure 
in the funds industry, relocation would entail high costs and uncertainty. In addition, path 
dependency and lock-in effects (e.g. Porteous, 1999; Sydow et al., 2009) can postpone or 
even completely eliminate the possibility of relocation. This may lead to higher costs for 
funds domiciled in Luxembourg than in other countries. 
Likewise, the successful launch of funds with higher fees can be explained by the 
differing sensitivity of investors with respect to costs. These funds are later primarily 
domiciled in the two unique financial centers. Lang (2012) has shown that the time required 
for a fund to be set up is of particular importance to its issuance. As reflected in our study, 
even strong competition between fund companies will not reduce the high fees charged in the 
initial stages, since fund fees are usually not adjusted throughout its lifetime (see Otten and 
Bams 2002, 2011). As a result, countries such as Luxembourg, which allow for the quick set-
up of funds, are especially popular for setting up funds which cater to new trends and are 
hence high in demand. This may explain why funds from Luxembourg do not charge 
significantly lower rates than funds from other countries despite the cluster effects, which are 
usually argued to give funds from Luxembourg comparative advantages relative to funds 
domiciled in other countries.  
 
3.2 Regulatory Variables 
Owing to the globalization of financial markets, fund regulation has become an important 
determinant of location for mutual funds companies. In the EU, the competition for the best 
regulatory framework has been intensified by the UCITS directive that has introduced a 
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product passport for mutual funds allowing any fund registered in one EU country to be sold 
in any other EU country without a lengthy authorization process. Since a more favorable 
regulatory environment should result in lower fees in a competitive market, we expect mutual 
fund fees to be lower in countries which impose fewer regulations on the domestic mutual 
fund industry. Indirect costs may arise if regulations increase the time-to-market. Hence, we 
presume that the regulatory environment directly influences the cost to set up and run a fund.  
We include several fund-specific regulatory variables in our model to analyze the 
impact of mutual fund regulations on fees. Since the regulatory variables are time-invariant, 
the country dummies are dropped from the model. However, given the importance of 
Luxembourg and Ireland, the dummies for both countries are left in the model.24 The results 
are reported in Models 2 to 4 of Table 10. 
The first regulatory variable included is CUSTODIAN. The custodian has a double 
mission of safekeeping the investment assets and carrying out a number of oversight functions 
to ensure that the fund company manages the assets in compliance with the law. The 
custodian fee is usually a percentage of net assets, so that custodian fees do rise with assets. 
CUSTODIAN measures whether the custodian bank has to be independent from the fund 
company or not. Functionally separate depositaries are one of the pillars of the UCITS 
framework. Since the requirement to have an independent custodian should drive up 
domiciliation costs, we would expect fees to be higher in countries that require an 
independent custodian (e.g. Germany and France). This is what we find. CUSTODIAN turns 
out to be significant (at the 1-percent level) and positive indicating that funds charge higher 
fees if they are required to have an independent custodian.  
The second regulatory variable included measures whether umbrella structures are 
permitted or not (UMBRELLA). An umbrella structure allows a fund company to offer sub-
                                                 
 24 In addition to standard errors clustered at firm level, we check whether our results change when we cluster 
standard errors at country level. The results are quantitatively and qualitatively the same and not reported for the 
sake of brevity. 
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funds which are traded individually but are organized under one legal entity. Since umbrella 
structures reduce costs, fees should be lower in countries that allow umbrella structures. The 
results do not support this hypothesis, however. UMBRELLA turns out to be insignificant for 
the total expense ratio, management fees and administrative fees. A possible explanation is 
that UMBRELLA is a country variable that does not distinguish between whether funds use 
these structures or not.  
The third fund-specific regulatory variable is TAX. Unlike Khorana et al. (2009), we do 
not analyze the impact of investor fund tax rates, because it should be irrelevant owing to 
pervasive double taxation agreements. Instead, we concentrate on the tax rate charged to the 
fund company in the country of domiciliation. Since taxes reduce profits, we expect fund 
companies to increase fees if taxes are higher as companies seek to maintain their profit 
margin. This suggests a positive relationship between fees and taxes. Our results do not 
support this hypothesis, however. Overall, we do not find consistent evidence that taxation 
matters for mutual fund fees. This is consistent with Lang (2012). He finds that the fund 
company tax burden is generally considered less important in the set-up decision by the fund 
experts who are responsible for domiciliation. 
Finally, we add a variable measuring the time necessary to start a mutual fund 
(STARTUP). Lang (2012) finds that European fund companies prefer to domicile their funds 
abroad if the start-up time is shorter than at home. The start-up process is almost always 
initiated by sales staff. The time needed to fulfill authorities’ requirements may decide on the 
sales pitch. Prima facie, one might expect fees of funds with a longer start-up time to be 
higher because of the possibly higher operating costs for the fund company. But mutual funds 
with the same underlying assets should follow the pricing mechanism of homogeneous goods 
stating that companies levy higher fees if they are on the market earlier than other fund 
companies. This is what we find. STARTUP is negative and significant (at the 1-percent 
level) for the total expense-ratio. The effect is almost entirely driven by higher administrative 
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costs, as STARTUP turns out to be insignificant for management fees. The result indicates 
that fees are lower if it takes a long time to set up a fund. The duration of the required start-up 
time leads to more competition on a growing supply-driven fund market over time and results 
in lower fees.25 Furthermore, funds issued earlier may have competitive advantages relative to 
funds that are issued later. This may be particularly relevant for funds investing in asset 
classes that are subject to current trends, such as gold or other commodities. This may give 
fund companies the possibility to raise fees due to less cost-sensitive investors which may be 
particularly relevant to funds investing in asset classes that are subject to current trends such 
as gold or other commodities. 
 
3.3 Further Controls 
Mutual fund fees may depend on other country-specific characteristics as well. For this 
reason, we include the logarithm of real GDP per capita (GDPPC) and an index of financial 
freedom (FINFREE) as additional control variables. The results are reported in Models 5, 6 
and 7 of Table 10. GDPPC controls for demand-side factors influencing fees in the fund 
industry. Khorana et al. (2005 and 2009) argue that the demand for mutual funds should be 
higher in more developed countries, suggesting a positive relationship between mutual fund 
fees and GDPPC as fund companies should have more power to raise fees if the demand for 
mutual funds is high. Our results do not support this hypothesis, as GDPPC turns out to be 
mostly insignificant. Furthermore, we include an index on financial freedom (FINFREE). 
FINFREE measures restrictions on banking activities and barriers to market access. Since 
competition among fund companies should be greater when financial freedom is high, we 
expect FINFREE and fees to be negatively related. Our results support this hypothesis as 
FINFREE is negative and partly significant for the total expense ratio and management fees 
                                                 
25 Wahal and Wang (2011) show that funds lower their fees to better compete when they face competition from 
new funds (as defined by the overlap in quarterly holdings). 
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and always significant for administrative fees. To control for the structure of the financial 
system in the country where the fund is domiciled, we further include the ratio of stock 
market capitalization to GDP (STKMCAP) and the ratio of deposit bank assets to GDP 
(DBAGDP). STKMTCAP measures the size of a country’s stock market, while the ratio of 
deposit bank assets over GDP (DBAGDP) controls for the size of the banking market. Since 
competition should be greater among financial institutions in countries with larger stock and 
banking markets, we expect mutual fund fees to be lower in countries with a more developed 
financial system. This is what we find. As indicated in Table 11 (Model 6, 9, 10 and 12) both 
variables turn out to be negative and significant in most regressions. More importantly, our 
results for the fund- and firm-specific variables as well as for the regulatory variables do not 
change even if we include additional country control variables. 
 
4. Sample Selection and Model Extension 
In the previous section, we already performed several robustness checks because we tested 
whether our results hold if we include country dummies as well as different sets of control 
variables. In this section, we additionally check whether our results depend on the choice of 
the sample. We are particularly concerned that our results are driven by the large number of 
funds domiciled in Luxembourg und Ireland.  
Luxembourg and Ireland have developed into international financial centers owing to a 
favorable regulatory environment. They are used as international hubs, i.e. the funds set up in 
these countries are predominantly sold in other countries. To check whether this has 
influenced our results, we drop all funds domiciled in Luxembourg and Ireland from our 
sample. The results are reported in Table 11 (Models 8 to 9). The exclusion of Luxembourg 
and Ireland considerably reduces the total number of funds observed. The main results, 
however, remain unchanged. This suggests that our results are not driven by the large number 
of funds from Luxembourg und Ireland. 
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[insert Table 11 about here] 
 
In the previous regressions, we found that mutual funds fees are significantly more 
expensive when they are sold in many countries. The descriptive analysis has shown that 
funds domiciled in Luxembourg and Ireland are sold in many more countries than funds from 
other countries. This suggests that Luxembourg and Ireland have specialized in distributing 
funds to several countries worldwide. These specialization advantages may make it cheaper to 
market a mutual fund from these countries in several foreign countries than, for example, 
from Finland. To analyze whether it is cheaper to distribute funds worldwide from 
Luxembourg and Ireland than from other countries, we interact SALE with the dummy 
variables for Luxembourg (SALE*LU) and Ireland (SALE*IE), respectively. The signs of 
these coefficients can then be used to assess the existence of specialization advantages in 
these countries. The results with interaction terms are reported in Table 12 (Model 11 to 12). 
They indicate that Luxembourg has significant advantages in distributing funds to 
foreign countries in terms of the total expense ratio and management fees. The negative 
coefficient suggests that the costs of distributing funds from Luxembourg are significantly 
lower than for all other countries. For instance, the results in Model 10 suggest that selling a 
fund in seven instead of only one country increases the total expense ratio by almost 30 basis 
points. The total expense ratio of a fund domiciled in Luxembourg that is sold in the same 
number of countries is 24 basis points lower. This is consistent with the hypothesis that 
Luxembourg has cost advantages in distributing funds abroad. However, there seems to be no 
significant effect on administrative fees as indicated by the insignificant coefficient for the 
interaction term for ADFEE. Ireland does not seem to offer specialized advantages in the 
distribution of funds abroad.  
[insert Table 12 about here] 
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5. Conclusion 
We have analyzed the determinants of mutual fund fees around the world with a particular 
focus on the fund domicile location. By focusing on the place of domicile, we assume that the 
process of international financial integration leads to greater competition among fund 
companies and will allow them to concentrate their activities in specialized hubs. This should 
lower the costs to set up and run a mutual fund. In the EU, financial integration is considered 
to be one of the key factors for making Europe more efficient and competitive, contributing to 
sustainable economic growth (European Commission, 2009). Since formerly separated 
national fund markets have evolved into supranational markets over the past years, fund 
companies are now better able to choose the country of domicile for new funds. This process 
should further intensify as a result of the implementation of the new UCITS IV directive in 
2011. When fully implemented, fund companies will be able to set up and manage a UCITS 
fund in another EU Member State without having to comply with local “substance-criteria” of 
infrastructure, i.e. the de facto requirement of having a subsidiary in the country in which the 
fund is domiciled. This leads to further decision opportunities for fund companies to optimize 
their business models geographically, which should further reduce fund fees. This applies not 
only to funds issued in the future, but also to existing funds merged from different countries 
with respect to their location commitments. 
 We examine the total expense ratio, management fee and, additionally, create a 
compound ratio of both factors in order to approximate the administrative expenses of a fund 
company. Our results show considerable variation in mutual fund fees across countries. While 
cost advantages are usually related to cluster effects of financial centers, we find that investors 
do not actually pay lower fees for funds based in specialized financial centers such as 
Luxembourg and Ireland compared to funds from most other countries. Likewise, putting 
together UCITS-compliant funds usually is more expensive for investors primarily due to 
greater administrative requirements which drive up costs.  
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Furthermore, our results strongly suggest that the length of time required to start a 
mutual fund is important as well. This may be particularly the case for funds investing in asset 
classes subject to current market trends. In the early stages of an rising market demand, such 
funds potentially attract a greater number of cost-insensitive investors, which allows fund 
companies to achieve higher profit margins. Moreover, as time goes by, strong competition 
leads to lower fees. Consequently, fund companies are anxious to choose a location with a 
prompt set-up process, wide registration experiences for abroad distribution, and a close 
cluster of experts in the whole value chain of a fund, such as Luxembourg. Furthermore, the 
distribution of funds across borders significantly increases fees as funds need to obtain sales 
partners and authorization in every country.  
These disadvantages on the investor’s side are outweighed by significant economies of 
scale that can be generated if the domiciliation of funds is centralized in financial centers. 
Financial integration creates economic benefits by encouraging the concentration of fund 
specialists in clusters, such as Luxembourg and Ireland. These benefits are reflected by 
significantly lower costs for the cross-border distribution of Luxembourg-based funds 
compared to funds domiciled in other countries. Our results suggest that the UCITS passport 
facilitates market access and allows the concentration of funds in financial centers. As a 
consequence, funds benefit from economies of scale, since the costs for investors decrease as 
the size of the funds and the fund companies increases. Fund companies that are more 
specialized in setting up certain types of mutual funds have lower fees as well, indicating 
efficiency gains from experience effects and specialist knowledge. Several further key 
findings emerge. We show that funds in countries protecting investors’ assets with 
independent custodians usually charge higher fees. Similarly, guarantee elements drive up the 
annual costs of funds, whereas institutional investors bear lower costs. Corporate tax 
considerations, in contrast, do not seem to be the main motive to choose the location to set up 
mutual funds. Foreign fund companies do not have cost disadvantages compared with 
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domestic companies. Overall, the UCITS framework leads to significant cost reductions, 
lower mutual funds fees and, thus, greater economic welfare. Our results strongly indicate that 
market integration seems to work in the globalized mutual fund industry. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Number of fund starts, by year 
 
Table 1 shows the distribution of mutual funds started by the 1,000 largest fund companies worldwide between 
1997 and 2006. The dataset includes all funds not characterized as the oldest share class, which is excluded to 
account for mistakes caused by duplicity of observations in our data. Furthermore, we drop all observations for 
which we have no information on fees and fund size. 
 
Obs. Percent Cum. 
1997 985 8.39 8.39 
1998 1,076 9.17 17.56 
1999 1,109 9.45 27.01 
2000 1,355 11.55 38.56 
2001 1,080 9.2 47.76 
2002 948 8.08 55.84 
2003 952 8.11 63.95 
2004 1,149 9.79 73.75 
2005 1,443 12.3 86.04 
2006 1,638 13.96 100 
Total 11,735 100 
 
 
Table 2: Number of funds, by fund type 
  
Table 2 shows the distribution of funds of the 1,000 largest fund companies worldwide according to fund type 
and the country in which the fund is domiciled. UCITS funds are funds compliant with the UCITS directive. 
Municipal fixed income funds are excluded as they are mostly driven by tax reasons. 
 
All Countries 
of which domiciled 
in Luxembourg 
of which domiciled 
in Ireland 
of which domiciled in 
all other countries 
Allocation 2,138 452 13 1,673 
Alternative 1,575 161 2 1,412 
Equity 5,497 1,543 200 3,754 
Fixed Income 1,960 681 96 1,183 
Money Market 565 97 14 454 
Total 11,735 2,934 325 8,476 
of which non-UCITS 
funds All Countries 
of which domiciled 
in Luxembourg 
of which domiciled 
in Ireland 
of which domiciled in 
all other countries 
Allocation 1,209 98 2 1,109 
Alternative 1,003 32 0 971 
Equity 2,580 68 11 2,501 
Fixed Income 829 54 6 769 
Money Market 326 16 2 308 
Total 5,947 268 21 5,658 
of which UCITS 
funds All Countries 
of which domiciled 
in Luxembourg 
of which domiciled 
in Ireland 
of which domiciled in 
all other countries 
Allocation 929 354 11 564 
Alternative 572 129 2 441 
Equity 2,917 1,475 189 1,253 
Fixed Income 1,131 627 90 414 
Money Market 239 81 12 146 
Total 5,788 2,666 304 2,818 
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Table 3: Number of funds, by country 
 
Table 3 shows the geographical distribution of mutual funds of the 1,000 largest fund companies worldwide 
between 1997 and 2006.  
 
  Number of Funds of which domiciled by foreign companies 
of which domiciled by 
domestic companies 
Austria 542 74 468 
Belgium 318 6 312 
Switzerland 193 62 131 
Germany 529 46 483 
Spain 1,580 171 1,409 
Finland 32 0 32 
France 1,454 386 1,068 
United Kingdom 690 212 478 
Ireland 325 321 4 
India 376 149 227 
Italy 12 0 12 
Luxembourg 2,934 2,911 23 
Mexico 59 25 34 
Malaysia 65 27 38 
Netherlands 107 0 107 
Norway 19 0 19 
Portugal 45 8 37 
Sweden 12 2 10 
Singapore 127 51 76 
Thailand 141 29 112 
Taiwan 191 78 113 
United States 1,984 193 1,791 
Total 11,735 4,751 6,984 
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Table 4: Number of countries in which funds are sold, by country 
 
Table 4 shows the mean, median, standard deviation, maximum and minimum values of the number of countries 
in which a fund is sold. Funds that are sold in more than one country are distributed across borders, while funds 
sold in only one country are usually distributed in a single market - the country in which they are domiciled. 
 
  Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Max.  Min. 
Austria 542 1.68 1.00 0.94 8.00 1.00 
Belgium 318 2.80 2.00 2.75 11.00 1.00 
Switzerland 193 1.09 1.00 0.32 3.00 1.00 
Germany 529 1.30 1.00 0.67 6.00 1.00 
Spain 1,580 1.00 1.00 0.06 2.00 1.00 
Finland 32 2.59 2.00 0.91 5.00 2.00 
France 1,454 1.25 1.00 0.97 10.00 1.00 
United Kingdom 690 1.81 1.00 2.23 15.00 1.00 
Ireland 325 8.70 8.00 4.82 21.00 1.00 
India 376 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Italy 12 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Luxembourg 2,934 11.97 12.00 8.16 39.00 1.00 
Mexico 59 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Malaysia 65 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Netherlands 107 1.07 1.00 0.25 2.00 1.00 
Norway 19 1.26 1.00 0.56 3.00 1.00 
Portugal 45 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Sweden 12 1.08 1.00 0.29 2.00 1.00 
Singapore 127 1.32 1.00 0.68 5.00 1.00 
Thailand 141 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Taiwan 191 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
United States 1,984 1.05 1.00 0.23 3.00 1.00 
Total 11,735 4.15 1.00 6.33 39.00 1.00 
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Table 5: Mutual fund fees, by country 
 
Table 5 shows weighted and asset-weighted means of mutual fund fees. Fees are weighted by fund size. Mutual 
fund fees are measured by the total expense ratio (TER), management fees (MGFEE) and administrative fees 
(ADFEE). Administrative fees are calculated as the difference between the total expense ratio and management 
fees. All fees are displayed in percent.  
 
  Total Expense Ratio Management Fees Administrative Fees 
  Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted 
Austria 1.72 1.36 1.09 0.94 0.63 0.42 
Belgium 1.21 1.20 0.90 0.86 0.31 0.34 
Switzerland 1.06 0.59 0.89 0.52 0.17 0.07 
Germany 1.40 1.08 1.00 0.87 0.39 0.21 
Spain 1.22 1.14 0.95 0.87 0.27 0.27 
Finland 1.82 1.92 1.65 1.78 0.17 0.14 
France 1.68 1.11 1.06 0.76 0.62 0.35 
United Kingdom 1.44 1.19 1.16 1.02 0.28 0.17 
Ireland 1.39 1.05 1.05 0.83 0.34 0.22 
India 1.64 1.09 0.78 0.56 0.85 0.53 
Italy 1.55 0.62 1.25 0.49 0.31 0.13 
Luxembourg 1.64 1.45 1.20 1.10 0.44 0.35 
Mexico 1.61 1.39 0.85 0.55 0.76 0.84 
Malaysia 1.48 1.20 1.29 1.11 0.18 0.09 
Netherlands 1.11 0.85 0.94 0.74 0.17 0.11 
Norway 1.35 1.29 1.27 1.22 0.08 0.07 
Portugal 1.42 1.18 1.17 0.92 0.25 0.27 
Sweden 1.55 1.56 1.30 1.32 0.25 0.24 
Singapore 1.93 1.67 1.28 1.26 0.65 0.41 
Thailand 0.97 0.86 0.75 0.67 0.21 0.19 
Taiwan 1.57 1.02 1.36 0.83 0.21 0.19 
United States 1.07 0.81 0.64 0.51 0.43 0.30 
Total 1.43 1.08 1.00 0.78 0.43 0.30 
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Table 6: Mutual fund fees, by fund type 
 
Table 6 shows weighted and asset-weighted means of mutual fund fees for different types of funds. Fees are 
weighted by fund size. Mutual fund fees are measured by the total expense ratio (TER), management fees 
(MGFEE) and administrative fees (ADFEE). Administrative fees are calculated as the difference between the 
total expense ratio and management fees. All fees are displayed in percent.  
 
Total Expense Ratio 
  Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Max.  Min. 
Allocation 2,138 1.19 1.25 0.75 6.97 0.06 
Alternative 1,575 1.37 1.35 0.55 4.32 0.02 
Equity 5,497 1.34 1.34 0.67 7.17 0.05 
Fixed Income 1,960 0.91 0.90 0.49 4.39 0.05 
Money Market 565 0.39 0.30 0.30 2.50 0.04 
Total 11,735 1.08 1.03 0.68 7.17 0.02 
 
Management Fees 
  Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Max.  Min. 
Allocation 2,138 0.81 0.81 0.58 2.97 0.01 
Alternative 1,575 1.01 1.00 0.45 2.46 0.01 
Equity 5,497 0.99 0.90 0.53 3.00 0.01 
Fixed Income 1,960 0.66 0.64 0.36 2.25 0.02 
Money Market 565 0.25 0.20 0.20 1.91 0.01 
Total 11,735 0.78 0.71 0.53 3.00 0.01 
       
Administrative Fees 
  Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Max.  Min. 
Allocation 2,138 0.39 0.24 0.47 5.97 0.01 
Alternative 1,575 0.36 0.20 0.42 2.85 0.01 
Equity 5,497 0.36 0.30 0.33 6.05 0.01 
Fixed Income 1,960 0.25 0.18 0.26 3.39 0.00 
Money Market 565 0.14 0.09 0.19 2.21 0.00 
Total 11,735 0.30 0.20 0.33 6.05 0.00 
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Table 7: Mutual fund fees, by number of countries in which a fund is sold 
 
Table 7 shows the mean, median, standard deviation, maximum and minimum values of mutual fund fees. Fees 
are weighted by fund size. Mutual fund fees are measured by the total expense ratio (TER), management fees 
(MGFEE) and administrative fees (ADFEE). Administrative fees are calculated as the difference between the 
total expense ratio and management fees. All fees are displayed in percent. 
 
Total Expense Ratio 
  Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Max.  Min. 
1 7,545 0.91 0.88 0.59 6.60 0.02 
2 to 3 1,473 0.96 0.81 0.69 7.17 0.07 
3 to 5 322 1.32 1.19 0.58 4.36 0.17 
5 to 7 232 1.45 1.31 1.05 6.97 0.17 
over 7 2,163 1.50 1.58 0.64 4.79 0.16 
Total 11,735 1.08 1.03 0.68 7.17 0.02 
       
Management Fees 
  Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Max.  Min. 
1 7,545 0.62 0.60 0.45 3.00 0.01 
2 to 3 1,473 0.71 0.60 0.53 3.00 0.03 
3 to 5 322 1.09 1.00 0.51 3.00 0.09 
5 to 7 232 1.05 1.02 0.62 2.75 0.05 
over 7 2,163 1.15 1.20 0.51 2.50 0.10 
Total 11,735 0.78 0.71 0.53 3.00 0.01 
Administration Fee 
  Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Max.  Min. 
1 7,545 0.29 0.17 0.31 4.98 0.00 
2 to 3 1,473 0.24 0.12 0.37 6.05 0.01 
3 to 5 322 0.23 0.17 0.22 3.00 0.01 
5 to 7 232 0.41 0.16 0.74 5.97 0.01 
over 7 2,163 0.35 0.32 0.28 3.29 0.01 
Total 11,735 0.30 0.20 0.33 6.05 0.00 
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Table 8: Mutual fund fees, by fund size 
 
Table 8 shows asset-weighted means of mutual funds of different sizes. Funds are differentiated based on their 
size in four quartiles. Mutual fund fees are measured by the total expense ratio (TER), management fees 
(MGFEE) and administrative fees (ADFEE). Administrative fees are calculated as the difference between the 
total expense ratio and management fees. All fees are displayed in percent.  
 
Total Expense Ratio 
  Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Max.  Min. 
1. Quartile 2,937 1.57 1.54 0.79 7.17 0.02 
2. Quartile 2,931 1.52 1.51 0.67 6.60 0.06 
3. Quartile 2,931 1.41 1.38 0.67 5.89 0.04 
4. Quartile 2,936 1.02 0.97 0.67 6.97 0.04 
Total 11,735 1.08 1.03 0.68 7.17 0.02 
Management Fees 
  Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Max.  Min. 
1. Quartile 2,937 1.04 1.00 0.56 3.00 0.01 
2. Quartile 2,931 1.08 1.05 0.53 3.00 0.01 
3. Quartile 2,931 1.02 1.00 0.52 3.00 0.01 
4. Quartile 2,936 0.74 0.66 0.52 2.50 0.01 
Total 11,735 0.78 0.71 0.53 3.00 0.01 
Administrative Fees 
  Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Max.  Min. 
1. Quartile 2,937 0.53 0.35 0.54 6.05 0.00 
2. Quartile 2,931 0.43 0.29 0.43 4.84 0.00 
3. Quartile 2,931 0.39 0.27 0.39 4.69 0.01 
4. Quartile 8,799 0.40 0.28 0.41 6.05 0.00 
Total 11,735 0.30 0.20 0.33 6.05 0.00 
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Table 9: Variables 
 
Table 9 describes the variables used in the regression analysis. 
 
Variable Description 
ALLOCATION Dummy variable for allocation funds. Source: Morningstar (2010) 
ALTERNATIVE Dummy variable for alternative funds. Source: Morningstar (2010) 
FIXED INCOME Dummy variable for fixed income funds. Source: Morningstar (2010) 
MONEY 
MARKET Dummy variable for money market funds. Source: Morningstar (2010) 
INSTITUTIONAL Dummy variable for institutional funds. Source: Morningstar (2010) 
GUARANTEE  Dummy variable for guarantee funds. Source: Morningstar (2010) 
UCITS Dummy variable for UCITS funds. Source: Morningstar (2010) 
SALE Number of countries in which a fund is sold. Source: Morningstar (2010) 
FUND SIZE Logarithm of the total fund assets, in Euro. Source: Morningstar (2010) 
FUND AGE Logarithm of the number of years since the fund was started. Source: Morningstar (2010) 
FIRM SIZE Logarithm of total assets under management, in Euro. Source: Morningstar (2010) 
FIRM AGE 
Logarithm of the number of years since the first fund of a fund company was set up. 
Source: Morningstar (2010) 
SPECIAL 
Sum of the squared assets (by fund type) set up by a fund company. Source: Morningstar 
(2010) 
FOREIGN 
Dummy variable indicating whether a fund was set up in a country other than the home 
country of the issuing company. Source: Morningstar (2010) 
IE Dummy variable for funds domiciled in Ireland. Source: Morningstar (2010) 
LU Dummy variable for funds domiciled in Luxembourg. Source: Morningstar (2010) 
CUSTODIAN Dummy variable for countries in which a custodian is mandatory. Source: KPMG (2010) 
UMBRELLA 
Dummy variable for countries in which umbrella structures are allowed. Source: KPMG 
(2010) 
TAX 
Tax rate charged to the mutual fund company in a country. Source: KPMG (2010), 
Country fund industry associations 
STARTUP 
Time necessary to start a mutual fund in a country. Source: KPMG (2010), PWC (2010), 
Country fund industry associations 
GDPPC Logarithm of the GDP per-capita in a country. Source: WDI (2010) 
STKMTCAP Ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP. Source: IMF (2010) 
DBAGDP Ratio of deposit-bank assets to GDP. Source: IMF (2010) 
FINFREE Index of Financial Freedom. Source: Heritage Foundation (2010) 
SALE*LU Interaction term between SALE and LU 
SALE*IE Interaction term between SALE and IE 
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Table 10: Regression results 
 
Table 10 reports the results of regressions with fund-specific regulatory variables. Panel A shows the results for 
the total expense ratio (TER), Panel B for management fees (MGFEE) and Panel C for administrative fees 
(ADFEE). Model 1 is the baseline model. Model 2 includes CUSTODIAN and TAX, Model 3 UMBRELLA, 
and STARTUP. Model 4 includes all fund-specific regulatory variables together. The size of the stock market 
(STKMTCAP) and the banking system (DBAGDP) are included in Model 5 and real GDP per capita (GDPPC) 
and the degree of financial freedom (FINFREE) in Model 6. All country variables are included in Model 7. The 
variables used in the regression analysis are described in Table 9. Regressions are estimated with robust standard 
errors clustered on the firm level. Country dummies are included in our baseline model (Model 1). ***/**/* 
indicates significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Total Expense Ratio 
  
Model 1 = 
Baseline 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
ALLOCATION -0.216*** -0.204*** -0.210*** -0.223*** -0.224*** -0.219*** -0.227*** 
(0.0279) (0.0300) (0.0293) (0.0292) (0.0300) (0.0289) (0.0298) 
ALTERNATIVE -0.907*** -0.927*** -0.889*** -0.985*** -0.967*** -0.959*** -0.952*** 
(0.0954) (0.0843) (0.0747) (0.0835) (0.0842) (0.0828) (0.0834) 
FIXED INCOME -0.692*** -0.702*** -0.660*** -0.671*** -0.682*** -0.672*** -0.675*** 
(0.0265) (0.0295) (0.0276) (0.0270) (0.0285) (0.0266) (0.0280) 
MONEY MARKET -1.102*** -1.102*** -1.075*** -1.125*** -1.113*** -1.132*** -1.121*** 
(0.0356) (0.0337) (0.0379) (0.0359) (0.0364) (0.0361) (0.0374) 
INSTITUTIONAL -0.473*** -0.484*** -0.516*** -0.490*** -0.483*** -0.482*** -0.478*** 
(0.0341) (0.0345) (0.0361) (0.0359) (0.0359) (0.0353) (0.0354) 
GUARANTEE 0.415*** 0.447*** 0.372*** 0.458*** 0.451*** 0.415*** 0.420*** 
(0.116) (0.112) (0.111) (0.108) (0.111) (0.111) (0.113) 
UCITSFUND 0.0671** 0.0669** 0.0525* 0.0158 0.0416 0.0382 0.0468 
(0.0334) (0.0291) (0.0285) (0.0275) (0.0297) (0.0292) (0.0304) 
SALE 0.00975*** 0.0117*** 0.0130*** 0.0122*** 0.00963*** 0.0108*** 0.00914*** 
(0.00297) (0.00305) (0.00286) (0.00297) (0.00334) (0.00292) (0.00326) 
FUND SIZE -0.0420*** -0.0472*** -0.0548*** -0.0499*** -0.0474*** -0.0464*** -0.0458*** 
(0.00652) (0.00718) (0.00681) (0.00670) (0.00664) (0.00653) (0.00648) 
FUND AGE 0.0173 0.0230* 0.0204 0.0181 -0.0351** 0.000421 -0.0444*** 
(0.0128) (0.0139) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0143) (0.0136) (0.0151) 
FIRM SIZE -0.0396*** -0.0358*** -0.0454*** -0.0415*** -0.0404*** -0.0414*** -0.0409*** 
(0.00750) (0.00751) (0.00800) (0.00771) (0.00761) (0.00769) (0.00760) 
FIRM AGE 0.0157 0.00427 -0.0245 -0.00193 0.0168 0.00490 0.0133 
(0.0320) (0.0323) (0.0324) (0.0324) (0.0283) (0.0331) (0.0288) 
SPECIAL -0.00000103 -0.0000144* -0.0000210** -0.0000136 -0.00000854 -0.0000100 -0.00000666 
(0.00000873) (0.00000854) (0.00000903) (0.00000845) (0.00000874) (0.00000848) (0.00000873) 
FOREIGN -0.0373 -0.00233 0.0129 -0.0204 -0.0371 -0.0245 -0.0360 
(0.0406) (0.0433) (0.0444) (0.0419) (0.0406) (0.0408) (0.0394) 
IE 0.282*** 0.0530 -0.252** -0.116 -0.489*** -0.187 -0.592*** 
(0.109) (0.136) (0.101) (0.134) (0.143) (0.130) (0.144) 
LUX 0.468*** 0.469*** 0.0000490 0.347*** 0.305*** 0.280*** 0.270*** 
(0.0831) (0.108) (0.0665) (0.103) (0.0962) (0.102) (0.0933) 
CUSTODIAN 0.406*** 0.321*** 0.276*** 0.188** 0.236*** 
(0.0776) (0.0692) (0.0706) (0.0791) (0.0704) 
TAX 0.00868 0.00402 0.0384 0.0676 0.0987* 
(0.00564) (0.00562) (0.0533) (0.0709) (0.0586) 
UMBRELLA -0.00972 0.0467 -0.0181*** -0.00388 -0.0244*** 
(0.0602) (0.0654) (0.00637) (0.00546) (0.00565) 
STARTUP -0.0604*** -0.0290*** -0.0356*** -0.0295*** -0.0320*** 
(0.0105) (0.0107) (0.00979) (0.0105) (0.00862) 
DBAGDP -0.391*** -0.427*** 
(0.0645) (0.0794) 
STMKTCAP -0.0276 -0.0488 
(0.0318) (0.0341) 
GDPPC -0.00445 0.0483* 
(0.0193) (0.0247) 
FINFREE -0.00330*** -0.00297** 
(0.00121) (0.00121) 
Observations 11,735 11,676 11,277 11,218 10,245 11,218 10,245 
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Panel B: Management Fees 
  
Model 1 = 
Baseline 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
ALLOCATION -0.207*** -0.197*** -0.185*** -0.196*** -0.193*** -0.198*** -0.197*** 
(0.0216) (0.0217) (0.0228) (0.0223) (0.0232) (0.0222) (0.0232) 
ALTERNATIVE -0.736*** -0.659*** -0.552*** -0.673*** -0.665*** -0.664*** -0.665*** 
(0.0785) (0.0639) (0.0569) (0.0663) (0.0680) (0.0665) (0.0682) 
FIXED INCOME -0.504*** -0.513*** -0.468*** -0.485*** -0.483*** -0.480*** -0.480*** 
(0.0180) (0.0194) (0.0186) (0.0182) (0.0197) (0.0178) (0.0195) 
MONEY MARKET -0.818*** -0.792*** -0.759*** -0.796*** -0.786*** -0.798*** -0.789*** 
(0.0278) (0.0257) (0.0274) (0.0268) (0.0289) (0.0270) (0.0293) 
INSTITUTIONAL -0.299*** -0.311*** -0.336*** -0.311*** -0.311*** -0.310*** -0.309*** 
(0.0311) (0.0308) (0.0301) (0.0318) (0.0316) (0.0315) (0.0312) 
GUARANTEE 0.418*** 0.405*** 0.297*** 0.401*** 0.400*** 0.389*** 0.395*** 
(0.0857) (0.0803) (0.0842) (0.0826) (0.0832) (0.0846) (0.0852) 
UCITSFUND 0.114*** 0.148*** 0.200*** 0.144*** 0.145*** 0.143*** 0.139*** 
(0.0274) (0.0248) (0.0277) (0.0255) (0.0288) (0.0267) (0.0297) 
SALE 0.00852*** 0.00811*** 0.00971*** 0.00850*** 0.00817*** 0.00850*** 0.00823*** 
(0.00292) (0.00289) (0.00295) (0.00289) (0.00277) (0.00294) (0.00278) 
FUND SIZE -0.00658 -0.00858 -0.0165*** -0.0108** -0.00996* -0.0109** -0.0101* 
(0.00540) (0.00545) (0.00580) (0.00536) (0.00547) (0.00533) (0.00549) 
FUND AGE 0.00536 0.00962 0.00549 0.00704 -0.00211 0.00556 -0.00679 
(0.00986) (0.0102) (0.0105) (0.0101) (0.0119) (0.0110) (0.0122) 
FIRM SIZE -0.0180*** -0.0150*** -0.0231*** -0.0165*** -0.0178*** -0.0169*** -0.0180*** 
(0.00562) (0.00569) (0.00645) (0.00582) (0.00576) (0.00583) (0.00579) 
FIRM AGE 0.0284 0.0263 0.000459 0.0280 0.0246 0.0231 0.0195 
(0.0230) (0.0225) (0.0244) (0.0223) (0.0205) (0.0232) (0.0209) 
SPECIAL -0.00000152 0.00000333 -0.00000455 0.00000151 0.00000119 0.00000178 0.00000136 
(0.00000713) (0.00000683) (0.00000775) (0.00000692) (0.00000713) (0.00000701) (0.00000709)
FOREIGN -0.0458 -0.0333 -0.0268 -0.0546 -0.0574* -0.0533 -0.0552* 
(0.0319) (0.0333) (0.0357) (0.0334) (0.0320) (0.0332) (0.0316) 
IE 0.357*** -0.321*** -0.161** -0.386*** -0.467*** -0.403*** -0.553*** 
(0.0827) (0.0966) (0.0777) (0.0981) (0.110) (0.0969) (0.115) 
LUX 0.445*** 0.225*** 0.00293 0.178** 0.147* 0.170** 0.148* 
(0.0648) (0.0814) (0.0555) (0.0841) (0.0800) (0.0842) (0.0839) 
CUSTODIAN 0.214*** 0.189*** 0.150** 0.191*** 0.181** 
(0.0523) (0.0539) (0.0622) (0.0633) (0.0745) 
TAX -0.0148*** -0.0169*** 0.0975* 0.132*** 0.138** 
(0.00350) (0.00350) (0.0569) (0.0456) (0.0603) 
UMBRELLA -0.0273 0.110** -0.0219*** -0.0180*** -0.0252*** 
(0.0428) (0.0432) (0.00462) (0.00371) (0.00469) 
STARTUP -0.0450*** -0.00902 -0.00922 -0.00619 -0.00612 
(0.00850) (0.00748) (0.00805) (0.00732) (0.00784) 
DBAGDP -0.0456 -0.110 
(0.0673) (0.0761) 
STMKTCAP -0.0126 -0.0374 
(0.0348) (0.0350) 
GDPPC 0.0287* 0.0424** 
(0.0149) (0.0188) 
FINFREE -0.00129 -0.000804 
(0.000860) (0.000924) 
Observations 11,735 11,676 11,277 11,218 10,245 11,218 10,245 
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Panel C: Administrative Fees 
  
Model 1 = 
Baseline 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
ALLOCATION -0.00891 -0.00683 -0.0250 -0.0265 -0.0305 -0.0206 -0.0296 
(0.0214) (0.0229) (0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0243) (0.0225) (0.0242) 
ALTERNATIVE -0.171*** -0.268*** -0.337*** -0.312*** -0.302*** -0.295*** -0.286*** 
(0.0391) (0.0420) (0.0382) (0.0418) (0.0419) (0.0394) (0.0402) 
FIXED INCOME -0.188*** -0.189*** -0.192*** -0.186*** -0.198*** -0.191*** -0.196*** 
(0.0172) (0.0181) (0.0182) (0.0180) (0.0184) (0.0182) (0.0182) 
MONEY MARKET -0.285*** -0.310*** -0.316*** -0.329*** -0.327*** -0.334*** -0.332*** 
(0.0268) (0.0247) (0.0275) (0.0261) (0.0262) (0.0264) (0.0269) 
INSTITUTIONAL -0.174*** -0.173*** -0.180*** -0.179*** -0.172*** -0.171*** -0.168*** 
(0.0177) (0.0178) (0.0191) (0.0177) (0.0182) (0.0175) (0.0181) 
GUARANTEE -0.00371 0.0414 0.0752* 0.0568 0.0517 0.0263 0.0250 
(0.0433) (0.0462) (0.0400) (0.0421) (0.0432) (0.0418) (0.0425) 
UCITSFUND -0.0471* -0.0806*** -0.148*** -0.128*** -0.104*** -0.105*** -0.0926*** 
(0.0259) (0.0252) (0.0251) (0.0249) (0.0254) (0.0250) (0.0254) 
SALE 0.00123 0.00354 0.00326 0.00367 0.00147 0.00230 0.000909 
(0.00285) (0.00268) (0.00271) (0.00268) (0.00312) (0.00271) (0.00308) 
FUND SIZE -0.0355*** -0.0386*** -0.0384*** -0.0391*** -0.0375*** -0.0355*** -0.0357*** 
(0.00605) (0.00621) (0.00617) (0.00616) (0.00622) (0.00625) (0.00622) 
FUND AGE 0.0119 0.0134 0.0149 0.0111 -0.0330** -0.00514 -0.0376*** 
(0.00963) (0.0101) (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0128) (0.0110) (0.0134) 
FIRM SIZE -0.0216*** -0.0208*** -0.0222*** -0.0250*** -0.0226*** -0.0245*** -0.0229*** 
(0.00608) (0.00642) (0.00652) (0.00644) (0.00643) (0.00634) (0.00633) 
FIRM AGE -0.0127 -0.0220 -0.0250 -0.0300 -0.00780 -0.0182 -0.00622 
(0.0193) (0.0206) (0.0200) (0.0201) (0.0183) (0.0202) (0.0186) 
SPECIAL 0.000000493 -0.0000177*** -0.0000165*** -0.0000151** -0.00000973 -0.0000118* -0.00000802 
(0.00000635) (0.00000624) (0.00000627) (0.00000626) (0.00000627) (0.00000631) (0.00000631) 
FOREIGN 0.00849 0.0310 0.0397 0.0343 0.0203 0.0288 0.0192 
(0.0313) (0.0339) (0.0349) (0.0334) (0.0301) (0.0326) (0.0294) 
IE -0.0752 0.374*** -0.0912 0.270*** -0.0214 0.216** -0.0388 
(0.0662) (0.0968) (0.0679) (0.0941) (0.115) (0.0994) (0.123) 
LUX 0.0235 0.243*** -0.00288 0.169** 0.158** 0.110 0.122* 
(0.0594) (0.0751) (0.0522) (0.0691) (0.0709) (0.0788) (0.0714) 
CUSTODIAN 0.192*** 0.132*** 0.126** -0.00247 0.0544 
(0.0572) (0.0502) (0.0553) (0.0671) (0.0613) 
TAX 0.0235*** 0.0209*** -0.0590 -0.0645 -0.0391 
(0.00469) (0.00491) (0.0616) (0.0615) (0.0659) 
UMBRELLA 0.0176 -0.0636 0.00382 0.0141*** 0.000792 
(0.0496) (0.0574) (0.00583) (0.00544) (0.00595) 
STARTUP -0.0154** -0.0200** -0.0264*** -0.0233** -0.0259*** 
(0.00737) (0.00932) (0.00887) (0.0104) (0.00893) 
DBAGDP -0.345*** -0.316*** 
(0.0620) (0.0731) 
STMKTCAP -0.0150 -0.0114 
(0.0304) (0.0316) 
GDPPC -0.0332* 0.00593 
(0.0175) (0.0208) 
FINFREE -0.00202** -0.00217** 
(0.00101) (0.000950) 
Observations 11,735 11,676 11,277 11,218 10,245 11,218 10,245 
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Table 11: Results for different samples 
 
Table 11 reports the results of regressions with fund-specific regulatory variables. Panel A shows the results for 
the total expense ratio (TER), Panel B for management fees (MGFEE) and Panel C for administrative fees 
(ADFEE). Models 8 and 9 exclude Luxembourg and Ireland. The variables used in the regression analysis are 
described in Table 9. Regressions are estimated with robust standard errors clustered on the firm level. Country 
dummies are included in Model 8. ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Total Expense Ratio 
  Model 8 Model 9 
ALLOCATION -0.225*** -0.231*** 
(0.0368) (0.0366) 
ALTERNATIVE -1.028*** -0.999*** 
(0.0809) (0.0817) 
FIXED INCOME -0.696*** -0.686*** 
(0.0383) (0.0376) 
MONEY MARKET -1.109*** -1.100*** 
(0.0434) (0.0435) 
INSTITUTIONAL -0.436*** -0.417*** 
(0.0422) (0.0403) 
GUARANTEE 0.525*** 0.497*** 
(0.107) (0.112) 
UCITSFUND -0.0197 0.0147 
(0.0327) (0.0364) 
SALE 0.0478** 0.0446** 
(0.0191) (0.0186) 
FUND SIZE -0.0497*** -0.0448*** 
(0.00751) (0.00710) 
FUND AGE 0.0201 -0.0334** 
(0.0148) (0.0156) 
FIRM SIZE -0.0421*** -0.0404*** 
(0.00894) (0.00858) 
FIRM AGE -0.0145 0.0111 
(0.0336) (0.0297) 
SPECIAL -0.0000177* -0.00000722 
(0.00000978) (0.00000928) 
FOREIGN -0.0246 -0.0401 
(0.0422) (0.0399) 
CUSTODIAN 0.373*** 0.301*** 
(0.0836) (0.0820) 
TAX 0.0595 0.120** 
(0.0664) (0.0572) 
UMBRELLA 0.00549 -0.0259*** 
(0.00579) (0.00579) 
STARTUP -0.0235** -0.0282*** 
(0.0111) (0.00882) 
DBAGDP -0.491*** 
(0.0906) 
STMKTCAP -0.0644* 
(0.0372) 
GDPPC 0.0612** 
(0.0265) 
FINFREE -0.00292** 
(0.00137) 
Observations 7,959 7,447 
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Panel B: Management Fees 
  Model 8 Model 9 
ALLOCATION -0.201*** -0.209*** 
(0.0248) (0.0257) 
ALTERNATIVE -0.732*** -0.733*** 
(0.0599) (0.0648) 
FIXED INCOME -0.476*** -0.467*** 
(0.0236) (0.0232) 
MONEY MARKET -0.759*** -0.758*** 
(0.0284) (0.0301) 
INSTITUTIONAL -0.240*** -0.229*** 
(0.0348) (0.0336) 
GUARANTEE 0.475*** 0.469*** 
(0.0762) (0.0799) 
UCITSFUND 0.131*** 0.118*** 
(0.0298) (0.0342) 
SALE 0.0338*** 0.0318*** 
(0.0103) (0.0111) 
FUND SIZE -0.0127** -0.0103* 
(0.00593) (0.00587) 
FUND AGE 0.00815 -0.00286 
(0.0120) (0.0129) 
FIRM SIZE -0.0174** -0.0190*** 
(0.00693) (0.00682) 
FIRM AGE 0.00348 -0.00475 
(0.0216) (0.0209) 
SPECIAL 0.00000787 0.00000789 
(0.00000721) (0.00000705) 
FOREIGN -0.0653* -0.0645* 
(0.0354) (0.0334) 
CUSTODIAN 0.233*** 0.224*** 
(0.0630) (0.0861) 
TAX 0.105** 0.158** 
(0.0434) (0.0628) 
UMBRELLA -0.0147*** -0.0240*** 
(0.00375) (0.00503) 
STARTUP -0.00658 -0.00318 
(0.00809) (0.00837) 
DBAGDP -0.107 
(0.0894) 
STMKTCAP -0.0698* 
(0.0414) 
GDPPC 0.0511** 
(0.0203) 
FINFREE -0.000559 
(0.00104) 
Observations 7,959 7,447 
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Panel C: Administrative Fees 
  Model 8 Model 9 
ALLOCATION -0.0241 -0.0218 
(0.0277) (0.0276) 
ALTERNATIVE -0.296*** -0.266*** 
(0.0487) (0.0468) 
FIXED INCOME -0.220*** -0.219*** 
(0.0226) (0.0227) 
MONEY MARKET -0.349*** -0.342*** 
(0.0293) (0.0302) 
INSTITUTIONAL -0.196*** -0.188*** 
(0.0209) (0.0211) 
GUARANTEE 0.0504 0.0271 
(0.0494) (0.0497) 
UCITSFUND -0.151*** -0.104*** 
(0.0294) (0.0306) 
SALE 0.0140 0.0128 
(0.0149) (0.0141) 
FUND SIZE -0.0370*** -0.0345*** 
(0.00666) (0.00683) 
FUND AGE 0.0120 -0.0305** 
(0.0118) (0.0136) 
FIRM SIZE -0.0247*** -0.0214*** 
(0.00690) (0.00676) 
FIRM AGE -0.0180 0.0159 
(0.0223) (0.0194) 
SPECIAL -0.0000256*** -0.0000151** 
(0.00000633) (0.00000599) 
FOREIGN 0.0407 0.0244 
(0.0344) (0.0305) 
CUSTODIAN 0.139** 0.0771 
(0.0593) (0.0652) 
TAX -0.0458 -0.0379 
(0.0577) (0.0688) 
UMBRELLA 0.0202*** -0.00191 
(0.00492) (0.00593) 
STARTUP -0.0169* -0.0250*** 
(0.00931) (0.00878) 
DBAGDP -0.384*** 
(0.0877) 
STMKTCAP 0.00540 
(0.0376) 
GDPPC 0.0101 
(0.0222) 
FINFREE -0.00236** 
(0.00103) 
Observations 7,959 7,447 
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Table 12: Results with interaction terms 
Table 12 reports the regression results for different samples and with interaction terms for SALE. Panel A shows 
the results for the total expense ratio (TER), Panel B for management fees (MGFEE) and Panel C for 
administrative fees (ADFEE). Models 10, 11 and 12 include an interaction term for SALE. Regressions are 
estimated with robust standard errors clustered on the firm level. Mutual fund fees are measured by the total 
expense ratio (TER), management fees (MGFEE) and administrative fees (ADFEE). The variables used in the 
regression analysis are described in Table 8. ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Total Expense Ratio
  Model 10  Model 11 Model 12 
ALLOCATION -0.211*** -0.218*** -0.222*** 
(0.0283) (0.0297) (0.0301) 
ALTERNATIVE -0.912*** -0.988*** -0.952*** 
(0.0948) (0.0833) (0.0833) 
FIXED INCOME -0.690*** -0.669*** -0.675*** 
(0.0263) (0.0267) (0.0277) 
MONEY MARKET -1.097*** -1.118*** -1.114*** 
(0.0353) (0.0355) (0.0371) 
INSTITUTIONAL -0.479*** -0.494*** -0.483*** 
(0.0349) (0.0367) (0.0360) 
GUARANTEE 0.430*** 0.469*** 0.428*** 
(0.115) (0.108) (0.113) 
UCITSFUND 0.0558* 0.00212 0.0350 
(0.0335) (0.0284) (0.0312) 
SALE 0.0439** 0.0460** 0.0451** 
(0.0181) (0.0192) (0.0182) 
FUND SIZE -0.0429*** -0.0503*** -0.0466*** 
(0.00639) (0.00674) (0.00642) 
FUND AGE 0.0165 0.0174 -0.0460*** 
(0.0128) (0.0132) (0.0151) 
FIRM SIZE -0.0389*** -0.0409*** -0.0403*** 
(0.00755) (0.00779) (0.00768) 
FIRM AGE 0.0153 -0.00267 0.0120 
(0.0311) (0.0314) (0.0279) 
SPECIAL -0.000000148 -0.0000129 -0.00000601 
(0.00000871) (0.00000836) (0.00000864) 
FOREIGN -0.0434 -0.0273 -0.0452 
(0.0406) (0.0420) (0.0394) 
IE 0.216 -0.130 -0.608*** 
(0.138) (0.171) (0.174) 
LUX 0.538*** 0.467*** 0.387*** 
(0.0881) (0.121) (0.109) 
CUSTODIAN 0.360*** 0.273*** 
(0.0792) (0.0780) 
UMBRELLA 0.0552 0.107* 
(0.0657) (0.0586) 
TAX 0.00571 -0.0232*** 
(0.00581) (0.00574) 
STARTUP -0.0240** -0.0279*** 
(0.0112) (0.00872) 
GDPPC 0.0505** 
(0.0249) 
FINFREE -0.00300** 
(0.00121) 
DBAGDP -0.438*** 
(0.0790) 
STMKTCAP -0.0454 
(0.0344) 
SALE*IE -0.0207 -0.0213 -0.0239 
(0.0221) (0.0229) (0.0222) 
SALE*LU -0.0358** -0.0356* -0.0379** 
(0.0178) (0.0187) (0.0179) 
Observations 11,735 11,218 10,245 
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Panel B: Management Fees
  Model 10  Model 11 Model 12 
ALLOCATION -0.204*** -0.192*** -0.193*** 
(0.0218) (0.0224) (0.0235) 
ALTERNATIVE -0.739*** -0.674*** -0.664*** 
(0.0781) (0.0662) (0.0683) 
FIXED INCOME -0.503*** -0.483*** -0.479*** 
(0.0178) (0.0179) (0.0191) 
MONEY MARKET -0.814*** -0.791*** -0.785*** 
(0.0278) (0.0268) (0.0293) 
INSTITUTIONAL -0.303*** -0.314*** -0.313*** 
(0.0315) (0.0322) (0.0316) 
GUARANTEE 0.429*** 0.409*** 0.401*** 
(0.0853) (0.0823) (0.0849) 
UCITSFUND 0.106*** 0.134*** 0.131*** 
(0.0275) (0.0258) (0.0295) 
SALE 0.0331*** 0.0337*** 0.0329*** 
(0.0103) (0.0106) (0.0112) 
FUND SIZE -0.00720 -0.0112** -0.0106* 
(0.00530) (0.00542) (0.00545) 
FUND AGE 0.00490 0.00660 -0.00785 
(0.00987) (0.0102) (0.0123) 
FIRM SIZE -0.0176*** -0.0161*** -0.0176*** 
(0.00561) (0.00581) (0.00580) 
FIRM AGE 0.0278 0.0272 0.0183 
(0.0224) (0.0215) (0.0203) 
SPECIAL -0.00000103 0.00000187 0.00000168 
(0.00000718) (0.00000690) (0.00000710) 
FOREIGN -0.0499 -0.0595* -0.0613* 
(0.0322) (0.0338) (0.0322) 
IE 0.390*** -0.315** -0.492*** 
(0.103) (0.123) (0.139) 
LUX 0.490*** 0.262*** 0.223** 
(0.0655) (0.0913) (0.0922) 
CUSTODIAN 0.218*** 0.206** 
(0.0598) (0.0804) 
UMBRELLA 0.117*** 0.144** 
(0.0431) (0.0593) 
TAX -0.0157*** -0.0244*** 
(0.00366) (0.00489) 
STARTUP -0.00528 -0.00329 
(0.00806) (0.00802) 
GDPPC 0.0441** 
(0.0190) 
FINFREE -0.000821 
(0.000940) 
DBAGDP -0.119 
(0.0759) 
STMKTCAP -0.0350 
(0.0352) 
SALE*IE -0.0243* -0.0252* -0.0248* 
(0.0132) (0.0136) (0.0141) 
SALE*LU -0.0254*** -0.0260** -0.0255** 
(0.00979) (0.0101) (0.0109) 
Observations 11,735 11,218 10,245 
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Panel C: Administrative Fees 
  Model 10  Model 11 Model 12 
ALLOCATION -0.00786 -0.0255 -0.0285 
(0.0219) (0.0232) (0.0245) 
ALTERNATIVE -0.173*** -0.314*** -0.287*** 
(0.0390) (0.0418) (0.0401) 
FIXED INCOME -0.187*** -0.186*** -0.196*** 
(0.0173) (0.0179) (0.0182) 
MONEY MARKET -0.283*** -0.326*** -0.330*** 
(0.0265) (0.0257) (0.0265) 
INSTITUTIONAL -0.176*** -0.180*** -0.170*** 
(0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0185) 
GUARANTEE 0.000755 0.0598 0.0276 
(0.0429) (0.0424) (0.0424) 
UCITSFUND -0.0505* -0.132*** -0.0965*** 
(0.0262) (0.0261) (0.0265) 
SALE 0.0108 0.0124 0.0123 
(0.0141) (0.0146) (0.0137) 
FUND SIZE -0.0357*** -0.0392*** -0.0360*** 
(0.00600) (0.00612) (0.00618) 
FUND AGE 0.0116 0.0108 -0.0382*** 
(0.00965) (0.0104) (0.0135) 
FIRM SIZE -0.0213*** -0.0248*** -0.0227*** 
(0.00610) (0.00646) (0.00635) 
FIRM AGE -0.0125 -0.0299 -0.00635 
(0.0192) (0.0200) (0.0186) 
SPECIAL 0.000000882 -0.0000148** -0.00000769 
(0.00000631) (0.00000625) (0.00000627) 
FOREIGN 0.00658 0.0323 0.0161 
(0.0315) (0.0338) (0.0299) 
IE -0.175* 0.184 -0.116 
(0.0898) (0.126) (0.140) 
LUX 0.0485 0.205** 0.164* 
(0.0683) (0.0930) (0.0907) 
CUSTODIAN 0.142** 0.0661 
(0.0571) (0.0660) 
UMBRELLA -0.0616 -0.0366 
(0.0580) (0.0665) 
TAX 0.0214*** 0.00120 
(0.00506) (0.00594) 
STARTUP -0.0187** -0.0246*** 
(0.00943) (0.00896) 
GDPPC 0.00645 
(0.0210) 
FINFREE -0.00218** 
(0.000944) 
DBAGDP -0.319*** 
(0.0742) 
STMKTCAP -0.0104 
(0.0318) 
SALE*IE 0.00358 0.00398 0.000861 
(0.0168) (0.0175) (0.0165) 
SALE*LU -0.0104 -0.00955 -0.0124 
(0.0144) (0.0146) (0.0138) 
Observations 11,735 11,218 10,245 
 
 
